



5-2003

The role of planning in shifting from conflict management to conflict resolution : a case study of Belfast, Northern Ireland

Heather A. Wakenshaw

Recommended Citation

Wakenshaw, Heather A., "The role of planning in shifting from conflict management to conflict resolution : a case study of Belfast, Northern Ireland. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2003.
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I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Heather A. Wakenshaw entitled "The role of planning in shifting from conflict management to conflict resolution : a case study of Belfast, Northern Ireland." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Planning.

John D. Peine, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Heather Anne Wakenshaw "The Role of Planning in Shifting from Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution: A Case Study of Belfast, Northern Ireland." I have examined the final paper copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Planning, with a major in Planning.



Dr. John D. Peine, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and
recommend its acceptance:





Acceptance for the Council:


Vice Provost and Dean of
Graduate Studies

**The Role of Planning in Shifting from Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution:
A Case Study of Belfast, Northern Ireland**

**A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Science in Planning Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville**

**Heather A. Wakenshaw
May 2003**

Thesis
2003
.W25

CONSULTATION

SOUTHWORTH

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my grandfather, David Frampton Van Harlingen, who influenced my life in so many ways. His support has given me the strength to be adventurous in uncharted waters. Without it, I would not be who I am today.

Go raibh maith agat

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my friends, family, and committee members for their ongoing support throughout the process of writing this thesis. I would especially like to thank Dr. John Peine whose direction and words of wisdom kept me focused when my mind began to wonder. I would also like to thank Dr. Bruce Tonn, Professor James Spencer, Nancy Loftis, and Diane Pealor without their divine wisdom and help I would never have accomplished this thesis. Special thanks goes out to all my friends and family who have supported me throughout this process and still acknowledge my existence. I would like to thank Nate Pennington for graciously sharing his house with me so that I might work without distraction. Finally, I would like to thank my Irish family, the Denvir's, who provided me with room and board while in Belfast for the summer. Special thanks to Anne Marie Denvir, and her friends who gave me the adventure of a life time.

ABSTRACT

The violent history shared between Catholic and Protestant ethnic/religious groups in Northern Ireland has deteriorated the trust between both communities and public institutions. This conflict is most acute in Belfast, Northern Ireland's urban center, where 'peace lines' have been constructed to divide the two conflicting ethnic/religious groups. Planning agencies have struggled having to plan around the confines of conflict. These measures have resulted in managing conflict, and as a result it has been difficult for these agencies to resolve long term planning problems. In addition, planning agencies have relied on technical analysis and in doing so have inadvertently ignored deeper social issues. This is exhibited in plans and policies thus far that have concentrated on technical analysis in decision making. The organizational problem is that Northern Ireland is notably different from the rest of the U.K., and therefore traditional planning practice is not enough to ensure successful urban development. By incorporating conflict resolution strategies into the planning process many of the problems can be successfully accomplished.

The strategies for conflict resolution that are incorporated into the planning process are defined as consensus building, facilitation, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and evaluation. Building trust is central throughout the entire planning process. If planners were to incorporate these strategies they would be more successful in achieving goals and objectives. It is designed to start locally and grow nationally, and as it does the issue between national territorial ownership increasingly becomes inconsequential because the residents associate themselves more within a co-existent community.

Ideally, Northern Ireland becomes one independent and collective nation based on internal resolution.

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
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Map of Northern Ireland in Context of Territorial Occupation





(Source: CAIN, 2003)

Chapter One: Thesis Overview

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to gain a better perspective of the role urban planning has in a shift from conflict management to conflict resolution. It will not presume to prescribe a solution to conflict in totality, but rather how urban planning agencies have a vested interest and how they can influence the process of resolution rather than managing conflict as a coping mechanism. The focus area of this study is Belfast, Northern Ireland, which currently integrates conflict management into urban planning policies. This integration is the result of a violent history of conflict shared between Catholic and Protestant ethnic groups. Conflict management, as defined by Susan Stewart (1998), suggests that a problem is removed from a situation for a certain period of time, but still has an underling potential for conflict to erupt. Conflict resolution, on the other hand, eliminates the dispute in its entirety (Stewart, 1998). Many complications that urban planners face in Northern Ireland, as well as in many other countries, are directly linked to strategies that attempt to manage conflict. As a result, it is difficult to resolve underling issues critical to a successful planning process. This thesis will identify these strategies and describe how it has prolonged the division between Catholics and Protestants, as well as how a shift from conflict management to conflict resolution can go further in eliminating historical ethnic polarization.

In considering a shift in conflict management to conflict resolution four factors must be addressed to fully understand the complexity of this paradigm. These include the history of ethnic division, demographics, interagency structure, and planning policy.

These factors are individually powerful, and together they have been successful in creating a segregated community structure. This success is both blessed and cursed because the result of segregation protects the public but also reinforces hostility. These factors have influenced community structure and are counter-productive to resolving internal conflicts that arise periodically. In order for a paradigm shift to occur, elements that influence community structure have to be identified.

Belfast Northern Ireland has remained predominately segregated since the onset of English political control in the 17th century (Seaton, 1998). Today, communities within the city remain, in most part, entirely segregated based upon religious ethnic identity. These homogenous communities are both segregated out of will and enforcement as the result of conflict between Protestant and Catholic groups. Combined these groups contribute almost exclusively to the total population and are evenly divided in number (NISRA, 2003). Since 1969, Northern Ireland has been most noted for its sectarian violence and wide spread political unrest (Donnan, 1997). This recent history is commonly referred to as “the troubles” (Neill, 1993). It was at this critical point that Catholics began to protest against civil rights and the unequal policies that segregated their community. (See Appendix I)

To understand the implications of segregated community structure, it is first important to understand the political structure of Northern Ireland as well as its relation to England. This structure is responsible for how policies are administered and have helped to reaffirm segregation. Today, many planning decisions are made indirectly through the British government. The Department of Environment, Belfast Development Office (BDO), is responsible for overseeing all planning projects within the city (Neill, 1993).

In face of this centralized power, the elected Belfast city council only has the right of being consulted on planning matters. As a result, many planning strategies are closely intertwined with conflict management policies between multiple agencies as a means to control sectarian violence.

The most predominant and challenging planning strategy is the creation of physical barriers, known more commonly as 'peace lines' (Murtagh, 1995). Peace lines divide communities in an attempt to minimize sectarian violence between Catholic and Protestant ethnic groups. There are currently thirteen 'peace lines' in Belfast. These structures are nearly 20ft high and made of steel, barbed wire, and concrete (Murtagh, 1995). In addition, the barriers create a sense of boundary or edge between the two communities, which reinforce territorial convictions. Multiple agencies with vested interests were responsible for the creation of 'peace lines', but as indicated in a 1987 Housing Executive report 'Coping with Conflict' those same agencies are not responsible for improving the conditions in and around these areas.

This thesis will describe how planning has shaped the urban spatial structure, the problems created by conflict and managing for it, as well as how a shift from managing conflict to resolution could resolve other fundamental planning problems in Belfast. Thus far, policies have failed to solve deeply rooted ethnic division within shared segregated geographical areas. 'Wedge planning' describes the means of which planning has taken place in these communities as a means to cope with conflict. Much of the information is based on literature obtained in relation to Belfast Northern Ireland, however it is intended to provide examples and possible solutions to common problems found in other communities that experience conflict as a result of ethnic division. This research will

provide alternative principles for urban planning to help foster a more proactive movement beyond managing conflict to a more fruitful process of resolution.

Comments on the Literature

A large amount of literature has been published on both conflict management and conflict resolution. To narrow the focus, this thesis concentrates on literature that relates to case studies of conflict management and the process or implications it has had on Northern Ireland, and other countries that encounter similar problems. Additionally, it examines the limited number of studies that illustrate conflict resolution and the peace process in that country. Northern Ireland is not an island into itself in terms of conflict. Other countries have struggled with the similar conflicting issues (Gidron, 2002). Therefore, an examination of examples similar to that of Northern Ireland should also be included. Those countries that are most similar include Israel and apartheid South Africa. The process that these countries have followed can provide alternative means for achieving resolution over management.

Some literary sources use the words management and resolution interchangeably (Stewart, 1998). This presents a challenge to the research, in which techniques being utilized must be identified as management or resolution strategies. If the strategies are misrepresented, the research itself is in jeopardy of being misleading and fails to successfully create a shift from conflict management to conflict resolution. Many of the strategies that have been utilized are in effect the initial steps to resolution, but have not taken extra measures to move forward in the process, and therefore are still considered tools for managing conflict.

There is a wealth of information on Belfast and Northern Ireland in terms of its history, conflict, and urban planning. Of all the literature in review, this information is the most abundantly available. This information provides a solid foundation for reviewing the number of conflict management techniques that have been utilized. The most profound and essential information is the evenly divided ethnic social structure, which has been revealed in both 1991 and 2001 census information. This information together with urban planning initiatives will help to identify conflict management strategies that are at the core of policy making; thus enabling the ability to present alternative planning measures that facilitate a shift from conflict management to a more finalized resolution.

Research Question

How can urban planning policy move from focusing on conflict management to conflict resolution?

Methodology

To answer the research question, the following steps will be taken to achieve a thorough examination of the elements that are most indicative of the current state of conflict in Belfast Northern Ireland.

1. Describe the socio-economic dynamics of the ethnically divided population.
2. Summarize the cause and key events that have resulted in ethnic conflict.
3. Describe the role of planning in creating physical barriers to separate the conflicted populations.
4. Describe the theories of conflict management and conflict resolution, and identify their similarities and differences.

5. Identify planning principles that support conflict resolution theory.
6. Apply those principles to planning strategies that can be used to facilitate a paradigm shift in approaching conflict issues. Examples:
 - Cross-cultural mediation and communication to define commonalities in societal goals
 - Identify forums for communication among those with common concern.
 - Identify non-traditional leaders to facilitate dialog in and between communities.
 - Identify symbolic projects and programs that support the improvement of common concerns.
 - Select a symbolic elimination of a physical barrier that is relatively low risk to both communities.
 - Create collaborative voice to facilitate the marginalization of extremists.

Overview of Chapter Contents

This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter one is the introduction consisting of a brief overview of the current situation of conflict in Northern Ireland, a literature review of relevant literary materials, the research question and the methods for research. Chapter Two outlines the socio-economic dynamics representative of Belfast, as well as the social perceptions between the two ethnic communities. Chapter Three illustrates the key events of ethnic conflict that have shaped the physical and social character of Northern Ireland and more specifically the Belfast urban area. Chapter Four identifies the stakeholders within the urban planning network, how these agencies have and do conduct planning within the city, and how conflict management has been at the core of

their policies and initiatives. This chapter also identifies the interface communities that are directly affected by planning strategies, as well as obstacles now faced by agencies due these implemented strategies. Chapter Five provides a thorough examination of conflict management and conflict resolution, the similarities and differences to both and barriers to implementing resolution strategies. The chapter concludes by identifying additional tools that can be utilized to complement conflict resolution. Chapter Six brings the elements of socio-economic dynamics of the population, planning agencies, and resolution techniques together to create alternative strategies to bring about the peaceful resolution of conflict between both the Catholic and Protestant communities in the context of urban planning initiatives. Chapter Seven is the summation of the thesis, the possible limitations and constraints and further research that can be conducted to promote the peaceful resolution between communities in Northern Ireland as well as other communities faced with similar conflict.

Chapter Two: Socio-Economic Dynamics of the Population

Socio-Economic Dynamics

Social Characteristics

Northern Ireland is geographically the size of Connecticut (Seaton, 1998), and has a population of 1.6 million (NISRA, 2001). According to the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Association (2001), the population is 39% Protestant and 38% Catholic in ethnic origin. The other 23% make up a culmination of other ethnicities. These numbers have changed only slightly in the last thirty years. The change is attributed to an increase in population in the Catholic community. For centuries, Protestants have contributed to a somewhat larger segment of the population, however the Catholic community's figures are only slightly smaller and continue to show growth at an accelerated rate (Seaton, 1998). The distribution of population between the two groups contributes in part to the Protestant's historic hold of power and discrimination over the Catholic community. Until thirty years ago, the Catholic community had little to no organization in voicing their concerns over issues related to civil rights. As Catholic population numbers grew and conditions deteriorated in their communities, they began to arm themselves and attack in both peaceful and violent ways.

Belfast has a population of almost 280,000 people and a density of 24 persons per hectare (NISRA, 2001). Table 2.1 illustrates that interface communities within the urban area experience relatively higher densities, which can be attributed to an urban setting. However, as illustrated, Catholic communities are of the highest density.

Table 2.1: Resident Population, Ethnic Composition & Density (NISRA 2001)

Ethnic Association	Ethnic Composition	Community	All Persons	Males	Females	Area (hectares)	Population Density
N/A		Belfast	277391	129778	147613	11488	24
Catholic	(>80%)	Ardoyne	6591	3032	3559	58	113
Protestant	(>60%)	Balleymacarrett	4939	2258	2681	78	63
Catholic	(>90%)	Clonard	4419	2084	2335	61	72
Protestant	(>90%)	Duncairn	3997	1859	2138	924	4
Catholic	(>90%)	Falls	5043	2268	2775	120	42
Protestant	(>90%)	Island	4275	1988	2287	381	11
Catholic	(>80%)	New Lodge	5214	2431	2783	72	73
Protestant	(>70%)	Shaftesbury	5745	2750	2995	223	26
Protestant	(>90%)	Shankill	3790	1744	2046	93	41
Protestant	(>90%)	Woodvale	4609	2086	2523	57	81

This is one indication that Catholic communities are experiencing overcrowding as a result of an increase in population growth. Protestant communities that show higher figures of density also have lower levels of religious composition. For example, Balleymacarrett has a population density of 63 persons per hectare, and a religious composition greater than 60 percent. This may indicate in-migration of the Catholic population. These are basic assumptions and further analysis would be needed to determine its validity. One observation is certain, the number of women in each community is slightly larger than its male counter-part. Several studies have indicated that women are more likely to accept people of other religious origin and favor attempts of cross-community interaction (Gidron et. al., 2002; Seaton, 1998; Murtagh 2002). This willful interaction is an important indicator and factor in moving towards a peaceful resolution.

Housing

Catholic families tend to be larger in number than Protestant families, and as a result have a higher rate of population growth in Northern Ireland (Murtagh, 1995). This contributes to overcrowding in homes with two or more family members sharing bedrooms. Overcrowding is not limited to individual homes, but to entire communities as well. While Catholic communities are overcrowded and in desperate need for space, Protestant communities are blighted with vacant dwellings on nearly every street. According to the 1991 census, Catholic communities are on average 12% more overcrowded than Protestant and integrated neighborhoods (NISRA 1991). This is illustrated in the map of religious distribution in Belfast (page xvii) where clearly Catholic population represents significantly less territory.

Throughout the United Kingdom there is a general concern about the growing gap between the cost of housing and household incomes (NIHE, 2001). In Northern Ireland, first time buyers are having a difficult time buying property in the location of their choice. The average cost of a home in Belfast is nearly one hundred thousand dollars (NIHE 2001). The alternative to this is the social housing program. Based on figures presented by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, the waiting list for public housing is greatest in areas in close proximity to interface areas and the number of available dwelling units in the social housing sector is much greater in these locations (NIHE, 2001). This limits people to particular locations of residence most commonly in interface areas. In December 2000, the total waiting list for homes was 32,056; almost half of the applications were for housing transfers (NIHE, 2001). Problems in infrastructure, physical space, and availability are all common problems that planning

agencies are struggling to solve. Peace lines dividing residential areas further hinder possible solutions that could be achieved.

Children and the Educational System

The long-term antipathy between the two communities has created an ethos, in which the opposing ethnic group is “demonized” (Seaton, 1998). Children learn these values from their families and community environments. As a result, violence has become a common part of the socialization experience for children. As one resident explained, the rioting season is at its peak during the summer months after children leave school for holiday (Denvir, 2002). Currently, the judicial system lacks law for punishment against children who participate in unlawful acts of violence and vandalism. During riot outbreaks, adults (many just old enough to be prosecuted by law) stand along the fringe encouraging children to engage in unlawful acts. This is the result of current policies within the judicial system, which cannot punish children under the same laws that pertain to adults.

A very small percentage of students are enrolled in integrated schools. In these schools administrators attempt to create a curriculum, which teaches students an understanding of both traditions. The majority of children are in either state schools that promote a British Unionist tradition; or in Catholic schools, which promote Irish Nationalist tradition. Despite attempts at cross-cultural programs between schools, children tend to be isolated from each other and from opposing traditions (Murray, 1995). Catholic children tend to have higher dropout rates than do Protestant children, which contributes to higher unemployment rate (Seaton, 1998).

Institutions

Social institutions are considered to be structural reinforcers of the internal conflict within Northern Ireland. The community's fundamental interests are incompatible in their present structure; for the Protestants it is security and for Catholics it is equality (Raune et. al., 1991). Measures have been taken to restructure institutions in an attempt to address these concerns. For example, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), have until recently included an overwhelming majority of officers who are predominately Protestant. Part of the Good Friday Agreement, was to restructure the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and turn it into the PSNI. The RUC has been criticized for it's ethnic/religious profiling and was authorized to restructure its force to include more members of the Catholic community. The two main objectives within this restructuring were to hire a balance of officers from both ethnic groups and abolish a procedure to swear allegiance to the Queen.

The demands of coping with terrorist organizations of both groups have compromised human rights (Seaton, 1998). Due to the lack of confidence in the police system in Catholic inner city neighborhoods, many residents in these communities rely on the IRA to operate a quasi-police force. Incidences of punishment, beatings, shootings, and threats of exile to Ireland have become common. As a result, this has reinforced both the power and prestige of paramilitary organizations within Catholic communities, and further eroded the sense of security for the Protestant population. For crime statistics.

Economic Characteristics

The significant increase in violence has had a strong effect on the economy. Business is generated by conflict due to high incidences of property damage caused by vandalism. The number of construction related businesses are particularly significant. For example, glass manufacturing is a very lucrative industry due to the high level of vandalism throughout the city, which targets both residential and commercial areas. There is also a large market for private security firms to provide surveillance personnel in commercial businesses and construction sites, as well as personal systems within residential homes. The British government pays for the cost of damages to property and injuries suffered by people in connection with terrorist attacks, an estimated 40 million dollars annually (Seaton, 1998). Within the middle class community, there is little reason financially to discourage vandalism because many of their wages are derived either indirectly or directly from such activities. The professional or white-collar neighborhoods benefit from inexpensive housing and excellent schools for their children. In addition, all families in all communities benefit from annual subsidies of several billion dollars in maintenance of public services (Seaton, 1998).

Unemployment

The unemployment rate in Northern Ireland was 11% in 2002, and about 21 % of households received income support (NISRA, 2003). These figures are much higher in inner city neighborhoods of Belfast as the unemployment rate is 31 % and 41% of households receive income support (NISRA, 2003). Job losses have been most profound in shipbuilding, heavy engineering and textile sectors, which formed the basis of Protestant working class employment. Employment growth has been greatest in the

public and service sectors, areas that have traditionally benefited Catholic job chances (Murtagh, 2002). These structural changes have had uneven effects on the spatial economy and especially in the working class Protestant areas that have struggled to cope with de-industrialization. When associated with socio-demographic changes, the decline of inner city communities was bound to be disproportionate between Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods.

In the 1980's 'reimagining' in the city was the central focus for stimulating the economy. Urban regeneration targeted the expansion of the retail sector and office development. The main beneficiaries were the prosperous middle-class whose income was strengthened with high public spending (Neill, 1995). The project met criticism for the lack of long-term sustainability that it was projected to create. By 1994 retail growth had reached its plateau as rental space remained static (Neill, 1995). It was also unable to bring about a change in the larger unemployment situation. Many employees in the service industry live from paycheck to paycheck, as well as a significant number of temporary administrative opportunities, which do not support a sustainable means of income.

A project aimed at job creation in the urban area was "Making Belfast Work" program. Initiated in 1988, the program aimed to "stimulate greater economic activity, reinforce local enterprise, improve the quality of the environment and equip the people of these areas to compete successfully for available employment" (Murtagh, 1995). It accomplished this by providing more funding for schools, local health care facilities, job clubs, and adult education programs. In an evaluation of the program in 1993 no significant improvements to unemployment had been made placing the blame on the low

level of finance and the complexity of the deprivation problem (Murtagh, 1995). Other programs that have been established to improve the unemployment situation include the New Action Community Employment program and the Belfast Action Teams of which success or failure has not yet been determined.

Intercommunity & Cross Community Perceptions & Attitudes

There are two separate attitudes shared by both ethnic communities, attitudes towards those that share their own identity and those of the other ethnic group. According to data collected in both communities, a constant theme across all study areas is that Protestant communities judge Catholics less acceptable than Catholics do Protestants (Murtagh, 1995), although a majority of residents on both sides said that they would consider allowing members from another ethnic group to join clubs and societies and visit into one's neighborhood (Murtagh, 1995). As Catholic housing pressure continues to grow and as vacancy rates increase in Protestant neighborhoods, any in-migration would be perceived as the beginning of the end for the existing resident community. Due to the genuine fears over the future of territory and community stability, it is necessary that communities feel confident about their own identity and future stability before any cross community initiatives would be successful. Movement patterns and feelings of fear and threat depend on the level of tension or violence within close proximity to the community. The tension and violence increase at different times of the year. In particular, there is a feeling that traditional anniversaries, marches, and parades are contributory to the increased tension and hostile outbreaks. The implications are that this is where local community relation efforts should be targeted.

Peace building, conflict resolution, and cross community organizations have all been established to work within each or both the Catholic and Protestant communities in an attempt to bring about a peaceful coexistence. These organizations are varied, complex, and multifaceted with their own agendas. However, the general attempt of these organizations is to develop agendas that build on positive and productive links between the two communities. A recent study by the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA) estimated that there were over 5,000 active voluntary organizations absorbing 400 million dollars annually (Gidron, 2002). Many of the organizations that have been established are a direct result of the conflict associated between the two communities. Members of these organizations range from middle class individuals, whose motives are general altruism and philanthropy, to individuals with more immediate reasons for activism, such as living in areas affected by political violence (Gidron, 2002). Presumably, there is some degree of danger in the involvement with such organizations, however in reflection of the number that have been established the danger must be considered minimal.

Community Life at Interface Areas

Boal (1969) suggests that there is an inverse relationship between the degree of assimilation between two ethnic groups and the degree of residential segregation that exist between them. Increasing assimilation will be accompanied by decreasing segregation and the physical separation of residence may contribute to and reinforce division (Boal, 1969). The positive side of segregation is that concentration allows a group to maintain its social cohesion. It maintains cultural values, it strengthens social networks, and it allows the passing of critical thresholds for the support of institutions

(Murtagh, 2002). Interface areas represent the locations where segregated communities exist next to one another. In Belfast, sectarian violence and vandalism commonly occur in these locations.

Identified by Brendan Murtagh (1995), there are four categories of people who live in interface areas. These include liberals, leaders, young toughs, and the apathetic. The liberals are considered to be the largest group in residence, and tend to have a positive attitude towards members of the opposing community. There are the leaders, representing a small number of the population, who possess a certain degree of control over the local community. Then there are the young toughs, generally male, who are identified as a key element responsible for violent and destructive behaviors. Generally, young toughs are unemployed, experience high benefit dependency, and achieve relatively low levels of educational attainment (Murtagh, 1995). As one Catholic resident stated, their benefit dependency is in retaliation against British occupation. "If the British government will not give up Northern Ireland territory then they will bleed British governments pockets dry" (Denvir, 2002). In addition, they generally have little investment in their own community. Many of these young toughs are under legal age of prosecution so their actions go unpunished. The final group of residents is the apathetic, which are small in proportion and have little allegiance to a majority religion, political party or ethnic code. The most rational start in building cross-community relationships is to facilitate dialogue between individuals who Murtagh (1995) characterizes as the liberals, as well as those in leadership roles. This has already been accomplished in many of the communities and the results have been overwhelmingly successful.

Three factors identified in a recent study, if acknowledged by planners and policy makers, could reinforce cross-community initiatives and policies for the future. First, a majority of residents living in interface areas have a positive attitude towards the opposing community and to the idea of community relations as part of local development. Second, such an initiative can be severely restricted by extremists in the community who can often determine the rules governing local community life and the scope of independent action. Third, for planning policy to have any success planners must recognize the rules governing them, the way they are imposed, and their effect on local initiatives (Murtagh, 1995). Including residents in the planning process, of which initiatives are targeted at their communities, would have a positive effect.

Chapter Three: Key Events and Causes That Have Resulted In Ethnic Conflict

History of Territorial Conflict

Historical events have shaped the dynamics of how individuals live in Northern Ireland. The native Gaelic inhabitants and those who reside there now have struggled for independence since the 16th century. Table 3.1 provides a chronological account of the historical events that have shaped the physical and social character of Northern Ireland (See also Appendix I). The British monarchs intention was to colonize the North with Scottish and English settlers to give Britain a stronger control over its rebellious territory (McShefferey, 2000). The significance of this action, and similar discriminatory behaviors is the root of the country's current instability. Though an overwhelming majority of the population have been born and raised in Northern Ireland, as were their parents and generations before them, harsh sentiments still run deep.

Conflict between the two ethnic groups has been the focus of attention both nationally and internationally. The attention gained can be attributed to a series of violent attacks between various paramilitary organizations. In light of media attention, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is thought to be the primary terrorist organization associated with sectarian violence. More accurately, including the IRA, there are six primary paramilitary organizations in existence and most likely smaller more isolated cells. Those that identify themselves as fighters against British control include the IRA, or more accurately the Provisional IRA, and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA); and in turn those that are Loyalist include the Ulster Defense Association (UDA)

Table 3.1: Chronology of Events in Ireland From 1600-2002

Year	Event
Early 1600's	Formal "Plantation" of Scottish and English settlers in Ireland.
Late 1600's	Repressive "Penal Laws" established to restrict Catholics education, property ownership, religious practice and political participation.
1690	"Battle of the Boyne" the defeat of Catholic James by Protestant William of Orange.
1800	"The Act of Union" formally making Ireland part of the UK.
1800's	"Home Rule Movement" interest in gaining for local political power.
Early 1900's	Protestants (in attempt to preserve union with Great Britain) reject Home Rule.
1916	"Easter Rising" proclamation of the Irish Republic; rebellion was defeated.
1919	Sinn Fein representatives elected in Ireland; refused to attend session in London; formed its own parliament in Dublin. Irish volunteers later known as the IRA attack police and army; beginning of the Anglo-Irish War.
1920	"The Government of Ireland Act"; the partition of Ireland 26 counties in the south and 6 in the North each to have their own parliament and limited-self government. Republican movement rejected the act.
1921	Anglo-Irish War ends. The Anglo-Irish Treaty creating the Irish Free State. Self-governing but still apart of the UK.
1948	The Irish Free State becomes the Republic of Ireland and leaves the British Commonwealth.
1968	Civil rights campaign begins, Catholic want reforms for their community. Violence becomes common.
1972	"Bloody Sunday" unarmed civilians killed by British Army, violence escalates. N.I. Parliament "Stormont" suspended from direct-rule.
1970's – 1980's	High level of paramilitary violence.
1985	The Anglo-Irish Agreement; establishes consultation about N.I. by Ireland and Britain in attempt to resolve conflict situation.
1986 – 1991	Heightened attacks by republican paramilitaries against British; loyalist paramilitaries attack Sinn Fein politicians and activists.
1993	Downing Street Declaration- reaffirming attempt between Irish and British governments to resolve situation.

Table 3.1: (continued)

Year	Event
1994	IRA cease-fire is declared in august; loyalist cease-fire follows in October.
1996	IRA bomb attacks end cease-fire.
1997	IRA renews ceasefire; creation of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD).
1998	Peace Agreement established to share power in political process; mainly allowing Sinn Fein to engage in talks with British government.
1999	Direct Rule Ends as powers dissolve in the Northern Ireland assembly.
2000	Direct Rule reinstated; New Inquiry into the events of “Bloody Sunday”.
2002	IICD announces IRA has decommissioned; Direct Rule once again suspended after suspicion of IRA operations.

(Source: Seaton, 1998; CNN.com 2003)

operating as the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) (Seaton 1998). Sectarian violence goes far beyond the reports of international media coverage. Common occurrences of violence and vandalism occur in residential communities on a frequent basis. Helicopters frequently patrol the skies to monitor outbreaks that occur (author, 2002). Physical barriers, known as ‘peace lines’, have been erected to separate and minimize the threat of these incidences. At first glance, this may seem to serve as a solution, but it does not solve the deeper issues that result in conflict. In addition, such barriers create complications in other planning related areas and as a result under serve public needs.

Discrimination is found in employment, education, housing, public services, and access to political power. In common inquiry, a person can determine an individual’s religious or ethnic background by learning their last name, address, and/or educational

history. Though human rights laws have been established, bias still remains a considerable problem and contributes to a large sector of the population seeking qualified employment. Ultimately, this creates skewed unemployment rates, and unnecessarily high levels of impoverished people with dependency on public housing and other services.

Today, Northern Ireland is facing a pivotal point in its history as the Catholic population continues to grow and begins to replace the Protestants as the largest ethnic group in the country. This has created an interesting paradox of shifting power that has tension mounting in every facet of Northern Ireland, and which is also beginning to circulate into British and Irish governments as well. The British government's control in Northern Ireland would have been limited without the help of a resident population in the 17th century, which supported its governmental control. The Protestant community eagerly took on this responsibility. In response, for centuries the British government has turned a blind eye towards ethnic injustices that occurred in Northern Ireland. Today it is less obvious that such large-scale injustices occur, and though improvements have been made in the last twenty years, they still occur hidden behind politics and urban policies.

It is difficult for the Protestant community to share power and control after being its sole proprietor for such a prolonged period. In recent years, Protestants have protested for the removal of Catholic political parties, most notably Sinn Fein. Questionable tactics have been used to create suspicions of Sinn Fein's knowledge and connection with unlawful acts perpetrated by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). As a result, in October 2002 British government regained full control over Northern Ireland after alleged IRA activity. The Ulster Unionist political party refused to hold or attend sessions if Sinn

Fein members were present (BBC News 2002). This most recent case demonstrates the underlying fear of sharing power with a political party that supports the rights of a population soon to be larger than its own.

Since the 1998 Peace Agreement, which allowed power sharing as part of a deal for IRA ceasefire, the Ulster Unionist political party, has been searching for ways to regain control. In a sense this has been accomplished. In the fall of 2002, British Parliament reinstated its control over Northern Ireland after allegations from the Ulster Unionist political party accused Sinn Fein of having prior knowledge over an IRA arms dealing in South America and had leaked confidential documents to the paramilitary organization (BBC News, 2002). These accusations have never been proven. Coincidentally, the same political party that made accusations are still represented in the British Parliament. It proves that even at the highest levels of authority where policy making is accomplished bias can lead to corruptive acts to further disadvantage a select group of the population.

Civil Rights Movement

The civil rights campaign began in the mid-1960's with the formation of small groups of Catholics who attempted to achieve reform by lobbying for an end to abuses, such as discrimination in jobs, housing, and unfair electoral procedures. Initially the campaign was in the form of letters, pamphlets, and small local campaigns. These attempts were largely unsuccessful. This was until the summer of 1968, when the first of a series of civil rights marches began to take place. The marches proved to be dramatically successful. In just over a year the movement had provoked a tension within political and security institutions. The effectiveness of the Catholic civil right movement

was the product of changes on three levels: “changes in underlying power relations, conjunctural factors during the decade of the 1960’s, and the specific character of the civil rights campaign” (Raune et. al., 1993). Grievances that were addressed included housing, industrial location, regional development, jobs in the public sector, which all had an impact on the Catholic community.

Civil and minority rights movements were a growing trend internationally. The 1950’s and 1960’s provided models of non-violent protest: the Black civil rights campaign in the United States, the struggle against apartheid South Africa (Ruane et. al, 1993; Bollens, 1999). Demonstration and marches gained worldwide attention through publicized television broadcasts. Civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was part of this international trend, and as a result gained wider national and international support than traditional protest had done in the past.

Marches in Northern Ireland proved to be more problematic than in other regions of the world. “The civil rights movement could not easily be fitted into the unionist conceptual categories and they found it difficult to know how to respond to it: as old fashion nationalism in a new guise or as a desire for greater equality within the union?” (Raune et. al., 1993). Civil rights marches that traversed Protestant territory were perceived as a direct threat to their own community. This provoked violence at interface and flashpoint areas. At that time the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the B Special forces were “defenders of the Protestant community first, defenders of the Protestant state second, and normal policeman third” (Raune et. al., 1993). As a result, security forces responded to the marches as hostile attacks often beating demonstrators with batons and forcing them back with water cannons or rubber bullets. This was shown

on television broadcast throughout the world, and new civil rights organizations emerged demanding immediate response from the British government. The international attention proved to be successful; government inquiry into such allegations led to a system wide restructuring process in many public and governmental agencies.

International Commonalities

Northern Ireland is only one region where ethnic conflict has dictated the amount of control that planning agencies have over urban and regional initiatives. Other nations have faced similar situations to varying degrees including Israel and Palestine, post-apartheid South Africa and until recently Germany. Continuing conflict has required the on going intervention of the government to manage such critical situations. This has had significant effects on community structure, which will continue to occur if the validity and appropriateness of traditional planning practice is not questioned nor evaluated on its role within the context of larger resolution strategies. It is important for the purpose of this thesis to acknowledge that ethnic problems are a global issue and as planning cannot be held solely responsible for resolving conflict. Likewise, not all nations are at a stage where resolution can be achieved.

The situation in Israel and Palestine is one of the most extreme examples of where ethnic conflict affects the daily lives of its citizens. For decades the peace movement has made tireless efforts to gain national interest to end conflict. Today, it is still considered a failed attempt. The current instability of the situation can be characterized as one that Northern Ireland faced in the early 1970's at the height of the 'troubles'. At that time, England prepared to extract all Catholics from the their nation-state and relocate them to the Republic of Ireland (see Appendix I). "Many Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza,

and Israel express anxiety that the Israeli government may launch mass uprooting and expulsion” (AFSC, 2002). Today, extensive walls are being built around the Palestinians to reduce violence (Khatib, 2003). The words and actions are literally identical, but unfortunately in the context of a more unstable environment. This is only one example, which further indicates the need for resolution strategies to be incorporated into the realm of planning in cooperation with other public and governmental agencies.

Conflict resolution strategies in these contested areas have normally been instituted at a national or state level. “As a result of complex patterns of political and demographic change, the nation-state is decreasingly seen as the territorial answer to the problem of human political, economic, and social organization” (Bollens, 1999). The deterioration of stability in many nation-states has compelled international aid organizations, mediators, and political negotiators to look at sub-state regions and urban areas as more appropriate scales of involvement” (Bollens, 1999). This would have important implications on the role planning could have on the initiatives that are created to resolve ethnic conflict. Every nation-state and the urban areas within them are confronted with their own unique set and degree of ethnic disputes; however the basic human psychological behaviors are all very similar. To find a solution to conflict at a local or sub-state level could have more successful implications at a national level, and could be accepted as an example for other nations to follow.

Chapter Four: Urban Planning in Belfast

Political Structure and Core Planning Agencies

Political Structure

The political structure in Northern Ireland has fluctuated between various powers of authority in an attempt to maintain stability in the province. This has made it exceedingly difficult to determine the governmental entity in control and how decisions are being implemented. As part of the Northern Ireland Act in 1998, the Secretary of State, along with the House of Lords and the House of Common at Westminster, approved a devolution order to transfer certain powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont (CAIN, 2003). However, the power given to the Assembly has been suspended on several occasions, the latest being October 14th 2002. The result of these suspensions stem from instability and general deadlock of sessions due to the lack of trust between Protestant and Catholic political parties. At midnight on the 14th of October, Prime Minister Tony Blair indefinitely suspended the Northern Ireland Assembly (CAIN, 2003). The following day, John Reid, Secretary of State, expanded the responsibility of Northern Ireland Office Ministers.

The Secretary of State represents the interests of Northern Ireland in the British Cabinet. This position, along with the legislative power of Westminster, has the authority to suspend the more localized power of the Northern Ireland Assembly (CAIN, 2003). At this writing, all decisions are made through the Office of Secretary of State. This office is responsible for policing, security policy, prisons, criminal justice, international relations, taxation, national insurance, regulation of financial services, and the regulation

of telecommunications and broadcasting (CAIN, 2003). Four positions under the Secretary of State have assumed responsibility for departments formerly run through the Assembly (See figure 4.1). Minister of State assumed responsibility for the Departments of Education (DE), and Employment and Learning (DEL). Other Parliamentary positions under the Secretary have assumed responsibility over the Departments of Social Development (DSD), Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS), Equality, Human Rights and Community Relations (DEHRCR), Finance and Personnel (DFP), Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI), Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD), Economic Policy Unit and Europe, Environment (DOE), Regional Development (DRD) and Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL) (NIO, 2002). Below is an organizational chart of political offices and departmental structure within the context of Northern Ireland.

The universal structure of political instability stems beyond national level politics and into local level jurisdiction. For example, chairmanships on [political] committees were held by Unionists parties at the exclusion of Nationalists including Sinn Fein, the 2nd largest party represented in the city council (Neill 1993). However, based on several court decisions in 1993, Sinn Fein and other Nationalist parties were no longer excluded from council committees, or banned from civic functions, and for the first time were permitted equal access to all political documentation (Murtagh, 1995, 2002). This has been interpreted as a threat to Protestant's security and power. The result of shared power gives access to sensitive documents that could be used to undermine Unionist parties, and this ultimately weakens their sense of security. In addition, it gives new representation on committees that were historically one sided.




Figure 4.1: Political Structure & Departmental Responsibility

Public issues that have been politically controlled in the past and raise question of equal civil rights in Belfast, and throughout Northern Ireland, include the ban of the Irish language, the failure to recognize Gaelic sports, while in turn honoring British symbols, such as the singing the British National Anthem and Royal toasts at all civic functions (Neill, 1993). These actions and symbols undermine the Catholic's sense of equality, though small achievements in equality have been achieved. In June 2002, for the first time since the creation of the position of Lord Mayor over a century ago, a Nationalist was elected. The Lord Mayor, Alex Maskey of the Sinn Fein political party, was inducted into office in June 2002 (BBC News, 2002).

With respect to urban and regional planning in Belfast and throughout Northern Ireland, local government has little authority over the decision making process. Final decisions in planning are made by the Department of the Environment Belfast Development Office and the Northern Ireland Housing Executive. These agencies often sub-contract projects out to consulting firms who follow guidelines established by the Royal Town Planning Institute. Due to the centralized power of the DOE and the regional NIHE, many private firms are restricted as to how a project will be conducted. This also holds true for academia. Universities are dependant on the DOE for research funds and cannot afford the luxury of taking a critical position “for fear of biting off the hand that feeds it” (Neill, 1993). Due to harsh public criticism over inequality over the last several decades, professional planners have often marginalized their work in an effort to maintain a safe balance on social issues. This approach has prolonged and enhanced the underlying social problems that so famously plague Northern Ireland.

Department of the Environment Belfast Development Office

The Department of Environment (DOE) makes all the final decisions concerning planning issues throughout the United Kingdom. The pivotal agency within the DOE responsible for the planning of Belfast is the Belfast Development Office (BDO). The DOE is in effect an extension of central British administration under the control of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. It has been described as having the administrative responsibility for all the strategic planning in Northern Ireland. The functions of the BDO include designing policy for the development and redevelopment of the city and where necessary creating the legislative framework for the implementation of that policy (Neill, 1993).

In addition, the BDO facilitates meetings with various coordinating groups, which bring together government ministers and their officials, both administrative and professional, with representatives of Belfast City Council, statutory boards, trade unions, chamber of commerce, retailers, banks and professional institutions (Murtagh, 1995). These agencies are identified as stakeholders in the planning process. For example, the Office of Security under direct control of the Secretary of State is responsible for the authorization of 'peace lines' and the specific locations they would be built (NIHE, 2001). In addition, corporate developers have in the past had their own interests supported when consulted on planning matters. In the late 1980's and early 1990's, when 'reimaging' and privatization was at the forefront of planning initiatives, developers had access to closed planning meetings and were later contracted for those projects (Neill, 1993).

The Housing Executive

The Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) is not under direct control of the Secretary of State, however many of the policies and initiatives undertaken are influenced through governmental funding and an interconnected relationship with the Department of Social Development. The Housing Executive reports directly to a board, which is established through the Housing Commission. The Housing Commission established under the 1971 Housing Executive Act are consulted on all matters concerning the NIHE (NIHE, 2003). The commission is made up of 10 members seven of which are appointed the other three are nominated (NIHE, 2003). (See figure 4.2 NIHE organizational chart)




Figure 4.2: Northern Ireland Housing Executive Organizational Chart

As the government was breaking down and a mass population movement was occurring in 1969, so too was deterioration in housing and the need to make significant progress overwhelming. Many homes were overcrowded with little indoor plumbing and poor electrical and heating infrastructure. In the height of “the troubles”, as life seemed bleak at best, a force of determination in improving housing conditions emerged. These conditions lead to the Housing Executive Act of 1971. Two people, one from the Ministry of Development and another from the Housing Trust, formed the NIHE (Brett, 1986). It resulted in an unprecedented act of an entire restructuring of a public administrative office in Northern Ireland. By late 1971, the first hearing on future housing principles and policies took place. Though many policies have been criticized in regards to discrimination, many improvements have been made in the form of low interest loans and housing grants for improvement, upgrading and rehabilitation to infrastructure. The NIHE is also responsible for managing public sector housing, which is largely located in close proximity to interface areas. It has been a slow process of

improving housing conditions, and taken many years for the large-scale benefits to emerge. As of 2001, the Housing Executive manages over 30,000 dwelling units in the Belfast urban area (NIHE, 2001).

The Northern Ireland Housing Executive is responsible for public sector housing management and improvements as well as private sector investments in the form of loans and grants. The NIHE has suffered the same criticism as other agencies, and as a result, the agency is determined to ensure equality between communities by building homes from a standard template. “Blandness has prevailed in public sector and the Housing Executive happily admits it is a “housing factory” with only 24 housing types” (CMP Information Ltd., 2002). With over 30,000 homes and only 24 housing types, both communities are disadvantaged. Entire communities are left architecturally stale and lack the vibrancy and character that shapes cohesive residential communities.

Planning Initiatives

Focus on Privatization and the Central Business District

Between 1970 and 1975, the IRA bombing campaign destroyed nearly 300 establishments in the Belfast city center and over a quarter of retail space (Neill, 1993). As a result, defensive strategies and policies were initiated to minimize conflict. In 1978, a review of the city’s transportation strategies recommended a high-grade motorway. This initiative was the Westlink motorway that runs to the North and West of the city center. This created a divide between two high profile areas, the Falls and Shankill communities, well known for their riot activities. In addition, the Secretary of State, Roy Mason, established a committee to examine how to bring life back to the city and give it a brighter look. An external examination was also conducted to explore government

partnerships with private developers to redevelop the city center. As a result, a beautification plan along the river Lagan was proposed. The failure behind these projects was the lack of response to critical social problems.

The re-imaging of Belfast city center was further encouraged between 1980 and 1984, which can be contributed in part to a change in paramilitary strategy away from commercial bombing towards attacks on security forces and other state personnel (Neill, 1993). In part, this led to a relaxation of policies restricting city center curfews. As a result, retail businesses were operating with longer hours and many eating establishments reopened. Life in the city began to reemerge. Urban regeneration focused its attention on the expansion of the retail economy and office development. While this generated city council optimism, it also raised questions of sustainability. By 1985, the Belfast Urban Area Plan was published, a plan that focused strictly on 'reimaging' the city with little regard to the communities fundamental problems. In 1994, it was evident that the retail expansion had reached a plateau (Murtagh, 1995). Rental growth was fairly static and well-established businesses, dating back to the Victorian ages, closed their doors, unable to compete with corporate development.

The year 1991 was another major image-promoting year for Northern Ireland in general and Belfast in particular. A review of Belfast' city commercial property market uncovered a shift in development focus from retail to office uses. In addition, the Northern Ireland Department of Economic Development (1989) identified 'image' as the Province's major tourist marketing handicap. A new city plan was developed with a ten-year time frame with a goal recreating an image of Belfast. Its horizon was chosen in attempt to correlate the rate of urban change envisioned for Belfast and the lure of a new


century approaching. The DOE released a preliminary report on the production of a Belfast City Center Local Plan, in which its final form was published in 1994 (Neill, 1993). The central aim was to “improve the world-wide image of the city-center” by among other things “creating a number of memorable places, buildings, and events and providing high quality shopping, leisure and tourist facilities to make the city an international center” (Neill, 1993).

Several projects were singled out for improvements based on economic and historic images in the city. One such project was the Castle Court shopping center (see Figure 4.3). The renovations to the site proved to be a success and were heralded by city leaders. People returned in mass to shop at the new center. This was one indication that the city was returning to normality after two decades of violence. Another venture was the Laganside project that taps into the maritime tradition of Belfast (see Figure 4.4). The Laganside Harbor was the site of construction for the legendary ship Titanic. The project’s aim was to transform a neglected waterfront area by creating interconnecting areas of commercial, retail, light industrial, recreation and leisure uses. Work began on the 100 million dollar project in 1992, with a completion targeted in 1996 (Neil, 1993). Public donation strengthened both projects in the form of infrastructure and environmental improvements. In light of these improvements, Belfast continues to be laden with symbols of British identity; The Cranes of Harland and Wolff symbolizing to residents that the Laganside Harbor is still Protestant territory, and the official statues and street names of British origination are liberally represented in the city center.



(CAIN, 2003)

Figure 4.3: Castle Court on Royal Avenue



(CAIN, 2002)

Figure 4.4: Laganside Development

The theme surrounding the ‘reimagining’ of the city was “Belfast The Capital of Culture”. However, those involved with implementing the plan did not consider or choose to ignore the deeper more critical concerns of ethnic conflict. Critics argued that the plan for the city center needed to be concerned with more fundamental issues and not superficial image (Neill, 1993). In sectarian terms it is not neutral territory. For a considerable time after the Anglo-Irish Agreement, at the instigation of Unionist City Councilors, a “Belfast Says No” banner was draped across the front of the city hall building, a public institution that until recently continued to fly the Union Jack. The banner indicated to both governments and the general public that the Unionists disliked the clause in the Anglo-Irish Agreement that underscored the importance of shared political power (Neill, 1993). Within the constitutional arrangement at that time, cultural equality was impossible. It could not accommodate the conflicting identities that existed behind clashes of conventional ideology in Belfast. In this situation, the plan for “image” was a failure. It did not address the all too real ethnic division that existed. The Northern Ireland Tourist Board, in a shocking yet sobering statement, announced that “there could

well be a niche market in attracting the gaze of the curious 'terror tourist' (Magee and McGuckin, 1992). As one journalist suggested, "the macho prestige of holidaying in real live, but generally safe to bystanders, war threatens to turn Belfast into a terrorism theme park" (Margolis, 1993). Therefore, it can be argued that perhaps too much concentration on superficially 'reimagining' the city in the eyes of both Belfast residents, potential tourists, and investors was a distraction from dealing with real and deeply felt ethnic antagonisms (Neill, 1993).

It can be argued that in a very weak regional economy, the main beneficiaries of the Belfast's Urban Area Plan for 'reimagining' have been the middle class whose income has been substantially strengthened with high public spending on construction and who enjoy low cost housing, as well as the developers who took part in the planning process. However, the inability of the strategy to bring qualitative change in the social situation placed serious weight on the possibility of mobilizing consent behind a policy of planning for neutrality (Neill, 1993).

The government was then pressured to focus its energy on greater public interest programs concerned with more practical matters, such as housing programs, economic strategies, and conflict management. Persistent unemployment and poverty led to criticism of the government's reliance on private sector development, largely shaped by the United States model of trickle-down economics (Neill, 1993), as a means to recovery. In response, a government program was created in 1988, known as "Making Belfast Work". It aimed to "stimulate greater economic activity, reinforce local enterprise, improve the quality of the environment and equip people with skills to compete successfully for available employment" (Northern Ireland Information Service, 1988).

“Making Belfast Work”, though not a planning initiative, targeted communities with high levels of unemployment and poverty. Money was spent on school equipment, local health care facilities, environmental improvements, job clubs, and adult education programs. Economic measures included the upgrading of training, and improvement in literacy and mathematics. A review of the program in 1993 concluded that no significant progress had been made in improving unemployment rates (Murtagh, 1995). It was further criticized for the lack of support that the government contributed financially in relation to the scale and complexity of the problem. In addition, the objectives were too varied, which led to a lack of focus in the program and to its abolishment in 1997.


Planning for Conflict

The most dramatic period of population movement, as a result of ethnic turmoil in Belfast, came between 1969 and 1973 when an estimated 60,000 people left their homes (Murtagh, 1995). The concentration of movement came from working class areas of North, West, and East Belfast as a result of intense conflict between the Protestant and Catholic communities. In consequence to the violence, Northern Ireland Office of Security and the Newly formed Housing executive constructed thirteen ‘peace lines’ (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5). ‘Peace lines’ are tall physical barriers constructed of concrete and metal to separate opposing communities. (see Figure 4.6 and 4.7) According to the BDO, the cost of construction was nearly two million dollars (Murtagh, 1995). The ‘peace lines’ had varying effects on both the neighboring communities and government services. It created a negative economic impact due to the loss of annual rent income either from residents choosing to relocate to amore safe environment or from restricted access to nearby commercial services. Most property at interface areas is owned and

Table 4.1: Belfast 'Peace Lines' and Adjacent Neighborhoods

Peace line	Adjacent Neighborhoods	
	Catholic	Protestant
<i>North Belfast</i>		
Alliance/Glenbryn	Ardoyne	Alliance
Elimgrove Street	Oldpark Avenue	Torrens
Manor/Roe Street	Roseleigh	Groomsport Court
Duncairn Gardens	New Lodge	Tiger's Bay
Crumlin Road	Ardoyne	Shankill
<i>West Belfast</i>		
Unity Flats	Unity Flats	Lower Shankill
Northumberland/ Ardmoulin	Divis Flats	Shankill
Cupar Way	Falls	Shankill
Ainsworth Avenue	Springdale	Woodvale
Springhill Avenue	Ballymurphy	Springmartin
Springmartin Road	New Barnsley	Springmartin
<i>East Belfast</i>		
Lower Newtownards Road	Short Strand	Island
Bryson Street	Short Strand	Ballymacarett
Cluan Place	Short Strand	Cluan Place

(Source: Murtagh, 2002)



(Source: Murtagh, 2002)

Figure 4.5: Location of 'Peace Lines' Belfast Urban Area



(CAIN, 2003)

Figure 4.6: Example of a 'peace line' in North Belfast.



(CAIN, 2003)

Figure 4.7: Example of 'peace line' Gate that restricts access in and out of interface communities.

controlled by the NIHE. In addition, surplus land set aside for public housing was lost, a total property value of \$400,000 (Murtagh, 1995), and local retail, services, and facilities were severely limited. Many of these businesses were forced to close or relocate. However, the psychological, physical, and economical impact on residents was the most serious.

International media attention reporting on the conflict and the construction of 'peace lines' further proves the central position of 'reimaging' should not be the primary focus of planning policy in Belfast if it does not include resolution strategies. The harsh image of 'peace lines' promoted planning professionals to formulate design guidelines to soften the tone of hard concrete and steel frames by replacing them with colored brick, pastel renderings and extensive landscape.

More recently, land acquisition has been used in an attempt to 'reimage' interface zones. Light industrial and commercial land uses provide an alternative buffer between two communities and at the same time dismantle the harsh image of a peace line. This

type of approach is described as ‘wedge planning’ where land uses are used to create a buffer between residential areas to cope with conflict. However, this is still a superficial response to the complex problems that characterize life within these communities.

Based on empirical survey data, Brendan Murtagh (1995) suggests, “ that effective and efficient movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic and the orderly management of resources, services and facilities have been at the core of planning practice and education”. However, minority communities surrounded by ‘peace lines’ experience significant problems in activities such as getting to work, visiting friends and relatives and gaining access to health services and recreational facilities. In part, many people experience high poverty rates, which further limits their access to other benefits. These areas may have experienced high poverty levels before ‘peace lines’ existed, however these physical structures further hinder innovative improvements. The image and level of development of community infrastructure (i.e. ‘peace line’, and public facilities/services) limit solutions to local economic development opportunities. Economic indicators show that these areas have higher unemployment rates, have lower income, and have lower A level (high school) educational attainment. In addition, Catholic communities have higher levels of housing waiting lists, lower vacancy rates, and better correspondence between household size and property size (NISRA, 2001), which can all be attributed to the growing Catholic population. While on the other side of the peace line, Protestant’s complain that their communities are full of bricked up homes, boarded up businesses, and vacant land because their residents are moving out of these areas for security reasons. These extreme polar situations are a clear indication of the public’s need in both communities for successful planning strategies.

Planning Problems

Unlike traditional planning practice, which assumes the stability in institutional structures, contested cities must plan under conditions of instability and uncertainty. Given this situation, critical evaluation must question the very basis of traditional planning practice. Urban planning in Northern Ireland has focused on technical aspects in planning and has avoided any discussion concerning more anthropocentric issues. Furthermore, it has been ambivalent towards how the built environment should be structured when ethnic conflict is present. For example, where ethnic conflict is prevalent, physical barriers are constructed to separate opposing groups. The focus, largely driven by the Office of Security, is placed upon minimizing the current conflict. This serves immediate needs for safety and security; however it creates long-term negative implications in terms of public needs.

The City of Belfast has indicated that it wishes to promote itself as one of culture. 'Reimaging' the city alone will not succeed in achieving this vision. If Belfast was able to build an image based upon resolved differences, it would have a better chance at promoting itself as the 'City of Culture'. A trend that has emerged in the planning field is to create a central image of a community based upon a unique quality. Belfast, instead of capitalizing on the 'terror tourist', could create an industry around peace-building, functioning as a model for other contested communities to follow. Belfast could become the center for international peace-keeping and conflict resolution forum, similar to Geneva Switzerland which has successfully promoted itself as "the forum for world negotiation" (Geneva Welcome Center, 2002). The only way to achieve a vision such as

this is to incorporate conflict resolution strategies into urban planning policies, which reach into nearly every function within the city.

Chapter Five: Human Behavior, Conflict, and Resolution

Human Behavior

Conflicting perceptions and attitudes between ethnic groups is not a unique phenomenon to Northern Ireland, as illustrated by the example of Israel/Palestine. These feelings are the result of a more deeply rooted ethos between man and the environment (Ittelson, 1974). The environment is interpreted as the physical surroundings within which humans live. In understanding the complexities of social conflict, it is important to identify how man interacts with the environment, shaping it and being shaped by it (Ittelson, 1974). The identification of a few basic assumptions about this fundamental psychology underscores the complexities of common behaviors associated with the conflict in Northern Ireland:

1. A person experiences the environment through all the senses, which determines a particular response;
2. People are part of a larger system and how a person acts within it determines the setting;
3. The physical environment can influence human behavior in many ways and to various degrees;
4. The physical environment is fully intertwined to self-awareness;
5. The environment is often unnoticed until significant change occurs and adaptation takes place;
6. "The observed environment is not necessarily the real environment";
7. The environment can be understood as a set of mental images that vary from one individual or group to another;
8. The environment has symbolic value to each individual person.

(Ittelson et. al., 1974)

Based upon these assumptions, if similar conceptions about the environment are not shared then there is a potential for conflict to occur. There are fundamental behavioral factors that ultimately affect conflict at varying stages and to different degrees, which have implications on effective resolution. These include those in relation to man and his environment, as well as behavior attributed to human interaction. A list of these factors is identified below to provide a comprehensive outline of potential behavior characteristics that are identified in conflict theory and the course towards resolution.

1. **Cooperation-Competition:** Actions that determine the course of conflict as a constructive problem-solving accomplishment or a competitive win-lose or more appropriately lose-lose product.
2. **Social Justice:** Each group or individual has a unique perception of what is fair resolution.
3. **Motivation:** Each group has associated needs. In order to achieve resolution these needs have to be identified as those that foster conflict or are fostered by conflict.
4. **Trust:** Distrust is destructive to the process of resolution. For resolution to occur an attempt is needed to identify the processes that foster trust and those that reinforce distrust.
5. **Communication:** Misunderstanding can lead to conflict, which can lead to the deterioration of communication.
6. **Attribution Processes:** Emotional responses toward the opposing group are influenced by what intentions are attributed to them and the degree of responsibility that is imposed upon them.
7. **Persuasion:** Efforts are often channeled into persuading the opposition of the soundness of one position.
8. **Self Control:** Effective resolution actions require self-control. Distractions, unexpected events, and emotions (i.e. rage, pride, anxiety) can lead to loss of the important long-term goals.

9. **Power:** The distribution of power and how it is engaged influences the conflict resolution process. Power (e.g. economic resources, information, legitimate authority) determines the degree of influence over all those involved in the conflict.
10. **Violence:** A destructive course of actions that result from conflict.
11. **Judgmental Biases:** Misunderstandings, misperceptions, and potential biases interfere with the constructive resolution process.
12. **Personality:** Individual personalities influence their decisions and actions as well as those of others, which have a powerful affect of how resolution takes place.

(Deutsch et. al., 2000)

This has important implications when attempting to understand territoriality of groups. In the context of Belfast's interface communities, the sense of identity is territory. To lose territory is to lose one's identity. In Northern Ireland this is associated to ethnic/religious identity. The Protestants are in fear of losing their territory, while the Catholics are outraged by the lack of control over territory. This equates to the Protestant's need for security and the Catholics need of equality. Defense is a mechanism used by individuals or groups to maintain its territorial integrity (Porteous, 1977). Understanding the psychology intrinsic to individual and group response of territory will help practitioners understand the insecurities of both communities, which will contribute to a better approach in planning.

“ The value of perception, attitude, and preference studies for planning lies, first in discovering regularities and consistencies in behavior from empirical studies, and second, in sensitizing planners to individual and group differences” (Porteous, 1977). In planning terms, individual and group enlightenment may be achieved by discoveries of perceptions in both problems and solutions that differ between individuals and groups.

This can be a powerful cognitive tool in planning. There are, however, several problems and limitations that impact the effectiveness and reliability of the information being received from participants; information can be easily misrepresented or skewed; the measurability of attitudes and perceptions is debatable, and at best can only be measured through observation; “bias is inevitable”; and continuous questions and interviews can lead to an unwillingness to participate (Porteous, 1977). To overcome such limitations, there needs to be a synthesis between theory and practice, in which science and practical experience collectively contribute to the overall objective.

Conflict Theory and Practice

There are as many definitions for conflict as there are theories, but for the purpose here conflict can be defined as the stage at which the relationship between two interdependent groups are in total disagreement over shared territory, resources, and the power over both. “The conflict in Northern Ireland is at its very basic a struggle between those who wish to see Northern Ireland remain part of the United Kingdom and those who wish to see the reunification of the island of Ireland”(Deutsch et. al., 2000). This single assumption is the motive behind every approach to conflict resolution, which has always materialized from a national, multi-national, and/or international level. Greater emphasis towards resolution should be focused at the local level where territory is at the root of every public decision. In this case, when decisions are made, one group will not be compromised at the expense of another or marginalized by the decision maker in an attempt to avoid persecution. This only prolongs problems and further exacerbates the conflict.

There are a number of problems in the planning field (i.e. housing, economic development, and public infrastructure) because agencies have focused on technical aspects and evaded the social implications of many former projects. The solution is in the problem. The only foreseeable way to correct these problems is to move away from marginalized planning where decisions are based on strategies to cope with violence, and allow room for new strategies to be developed that incorporate conflict resolution into the planning process. To accomplish this the planner must take on the role of social scientist and practitioner of conflict resolution at a community level. Here, simple changes can make a difference in the outcome of the larger social problem that exists in Northern Ireland.

There are inevitable differences between theory and practice of the conflict theory discourse. As in many social science disciplines, there is a disconnect between science and practice. Science is criticized as being impractical, while aversely the practitioner is regarded as unscientific (Isenhardt et. al., 2000). To engage in a conflict resolution strategy that is centered upon deeply embedded ethos of power, security, territory, and ethnic/religious identity it will require a synthesis of both scientific theory and practical application. This is required to achieve a truly successful conflict resolution. A practitioner must take into account the many theories of conflict and pull practical information from each with relevance to the given situation. There is no well defined procedure for accomplishing such a complex task. Morton Deutsch (2000) points out that practitioners often work intuitively without being able to specify precisely how they are weaving together the theoretical ideas being utilized. It is for this reason that a synthesis

of ideas obtained from multiple and overlapping theories is used to provide relevant knowledge that can equip planners with practical strategies for resolving conflict.

Theories of Conflict

Historically, the study of conflict has been revisited time and again with such names as Charles Darwin with survival of the fittest; Karl Marx with the Communist Manifesto and class struggle; as well as Sigmund Freud with his theory of psychosexual development of struggle between biological id and social determination and the superego (Deutsch, 2000). Many of their ideas were manipulated into other forms of rationale where new evolutionary forms of empirical orientated and socio-psychological theories began to emerge. These theories are closely connected to social behaviors discussed earlier and in their own form resemble the conflict dynamics that are occurring in Northern Ireland. These theories include:

1. **Attribution Theory:** This perspective is based on attribution processes, which proposes that individuals make sense of their world by assigning qualities and causes to others based on what is relevant to them. Many Protestants and Catholics commonly attribute their current situation based on the blame assigned to the opposing group. For example, instead of seeing the problem of vandalism as youthful misconduct they assign blame to an entire ethnic group.
2. **Equity Theory:** This theory views conflict from the perspective of social justice, where each group perceives fair resolution differently. For example, one community may feel that they are not receiving or are restricted from adequate public services while to another group these amenities appear readily accessible.
3. **Field Theory:** This perspective views people's actions as a product of contextual forces. The forces are those impulses that are performed and those that are not performed. In the case of Northern Ireland, many Catholics are frustrated over the benefits that Protestants have received for their loyalty to Britain.
4. **Interactional Theory:** This theory views conflict as a process of ongoing negotiation about what is valued, how behaviors are interpreted, and the meaning of events. As Levi Strauss stated, "People create the situations they perceive, and what they perceive is also influenced by what they do" (Isenhardt et. al., 2000).

The ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland is a common part of every day life and it therefore dictates what residents do. For example, instead of using the most direct route to walk through a neighborhood in order to access public transportation, a person may walk another mile out of the way to avoid from walking through a community not their own for fear of harassment or physical attack.

5. **Phase Theory:** This theory is described through the series of events that develop over an extended period of time. Though scholars argue on the name and amount of phases that occur. Three common aspects are agreed upon: conflict proceeds through a predictable sequence of behaviors; behaviors that instigate conflict can be identified; and specific behaviors perpetuate the continuation and escalation of conflict. In the case of Northern Ireland there is a clear sequence of events that have shaped the dynamics of how individuals interact and perceive their environment.
6. **Psychodynamic Theory:** This theory goes back to psychologists and social scientists such as Freud who believe that people identify problems from an internal subconscious state (e.g. anxiety, ego, fear). Based on this theory it is believed that those involved in conflict will engage in compulsive and repetitive acts despite the knowledge that such behaviors are counterproductive. This is seen each summer as Orange Order marches take place throughout Northern Ireland. Many of the marchers hold positions vital to resolving conflict (i.e. political office and public service), however each year they continue to march through Catholic communities chanting blasphemous slogans.
7. **Social Exchange Theory:** This perspective of conflict is viewed similar to a market analysis. People make choices based on self-interest; they weigh options to determine the cost of actions. Under such a theory, compromises as a set of trade-offs are the most valuable tool. For Protestants, the fear of sharing power and losing control is too much of a cost, and therefore choices are made to protect their security. For Catholics it is equality.
8. **Systems Theory:** This view takes the perspective that there are units of an interrelated system, which influence each other and function within a larger system. Three categories describe a system breakdown: transactional redundancy, a subsystem becomes ineffective, and members of a system exceed their roles.
9. **Transformational Theory:** This theory focuses more on change and process than on explanations of how conflict occurs. This perspective accounts for the dynamic, changing quality of roles, relationships, and expectations and the

environment in which all these exist. This is evident in the ever-changing dynamics of the relationship between the Catholic and Protestant communities, which are perpetuated by a series of changes in governmental structures to protect their own integrity and control the larger population.

(Isenhardt et. al., 2000)

As indicated by the number of possible theories, there are a variety of perspectives of how and why conflict occurs. The focus of conflict can be identified by the way in which individuals or groups identify themselves and/or others within a given situation, as described in attribution, equity, and interactional theories; or conflict can be viewed as a series of behavioral actions and events as described in phase, system, and transformational theories. Together, these theories provide a broad and holistic understanding of the various directions and associations that conflict can arise from. With this in mind, steps to combat conflict from its most fundamental sources can be more readily achieved.


Strategies for Conflict Resolution

Ellen Raider and Susan Coleman (1997) developed a sequence of conflict resolution models for an International Negotiation Training Manual. The format of this manual is geared for training in consecutive three to six day workshops, however these models also work well incorporating into the planning process. These models provide a coherent system for achieving resolution that if paralleled with the planning process could provide planners with a framework that would supplement traditional planning. Illustrated below are the models used in the training manual, as well as a description of the functions they serve. The next chapter will describe in further detail how these models can be incorporated into the planning process.

The Conflict Resolution Continuum: provides a means for achieving an overview of the conflict by examining existing attitudes as well as formulating a general strategy that will determine the appropriate method for procedure (See Figure 5.1). There are several functions that this process can serve:

1. It establishes who the stakeholders are, and the existing attitudes they have to the current problem.
2. It helps to create a baseline assessment to determine strengths and weaknesses.
3. It helps diagnose discrepancies between what is perceived and what is actually being proposed.
4. It provides consequences of different approaches.
5. It provides a vision for the project.

Negotiation: is the process of problem-solving through collaboration. Through this process disputed parties exchange information and identify common problems and interests, and develop solutions that have mutual gains for each party. Part of this process requires that each party seek beneficial trade-offs and compromises. “Effective



(Source: Ellen Raider International, Inc., 1997)

Figure 5.1: The Conflict Resolution Continuum Model

negotiation depends on the ability of parties to share information about needs, issues, and interest” (Deutsch, 2000). Table 5.1 compares the elements between competitive and collaborative negotiation elements.

Competitive to Collaborative Reframing: Figure 5.2 serves as a framework to understand the elements of negotiation. This model creates a reference for distinguishing the needs of each group and how to reframe conflict from a competitive position to a collaborative one based on understanding and acknowledgement of underlying views. Once needs have been identified, they can collectively begin to be prioritized through a series of compromises, the “bargaining” process.


Mediation: is the process in which disputes are resolved with the assistance of a neutral third party (See Figure 5.3). The objective in this process is to help opposing sides find acceptable solutions to their conflict and “counter tendencies toward competitive win-lose strategies and objectives” (Deutsch, 2000). Mediation is not the solution to all conflicts. Eight elements are identified for determining the use of mediation:

1. The parties can identified.
2. They are interdependent.
3. They have basic cognitive, interpersonal, and emotional capabilities to represent themselves.
4. They have interests that are not entirely incompatible.
5. They face alternatives to consensual agreement that are undesirable.
6. There are existing interpersonal barriers.
7. There are existing substantive barriers.
8. There are existing procedural barriers.

Table 5.1 Competitive and Collaborative Negotiation Elements

Competitive	Collaborative
Positional Discussion	Interest-Focused Discussion
Forcing	Problem Solving
Intimidation	Arguments Based On Merit
Devaluing Others	Valuing Others
Win-Lose Attitude	Win-Win Attitude
Information Hiding	Information Sharing
Personal Gains	Joint Gains
Self-Focused	Empathy and Understanding
Self-Interests	Joint Interests
Power Over Others	Power shared

(Source: Isenhardt et.al., 2000)



(Source: Ellen Raider International, Inc., 1997)

Figure 5.2: Competition to Collaboration Reframing Model

Twelve Stages of Mediation

Stage 1: Establishing relationship with disputing parties

- Make initial contacts with the parties
- Build credibility
- Promote rapport
- Educate the parties about the process
- Increase commitment to the procedure

Stage 2: Selecting a strategy to guide mediation

- Assist the parties to assess various approaches to conflict management and resolution
- Assist the parties in selecting an approach
- Coordinate the approaches of the parties

Stage 3: Collecting and analyzing background information

- Collect and analyze relevant data about the people, dynamics, and substance of a conflict
- Verify accuracy in data
- Minimize the impact of inaccurate or unavailable data

Stage 4: Designing a detailed plan for mediation

- Identify strategies and consequent noncontingent strategies that enable the parties to move toward agreement
- Identify contingent strategies to respond to situations peculiar to the specific conflict

Stage 5: Building trust and cooperation

- Prepare disputants psychologically to participate in negotiations on substantive issues
- Handle strong emotions
- Check perceptions and minimize effects of stereotypes
- Build recognition of the legitimacy of the parties and issues
- Build trust
- Clarify communications

Stage 6: Beginning the mediation session

- Open negotiation between parties
- Establish an open and positive tone
- Establish ground rules and behavioral guidelines
- Assist the parties in venting emotions
- Delimit topic areas and issues for discussion
- Assist the parties in exploring commitments, salience, and influence

Stage 7: Defining issues and setting an agenda

- Identify broad topic areas of concern to the parties
- Obtain agreement on the issues to be discussed
- Determine the sequence for handling the issues

Stage 8: Uncovering hidden interests of the disputing parties

- Identify the substantive, procedural, and psychological interests of the parties
- Educate the parties about each other's interests

Figure 5.3: Twelve Stages of Mediation

(Continued)

Stage 9: Generating options for settlement

- Develop an awareness among the parties of the need for multiple opinions
- Lower commitment to positions or sole alternatives
- Generate options using either positional or interest based bargaining

Stage 10: Assessing options for settlement

- Review the interests of the parties
- Assess how interests can be met by available options
- Assess the costs and benefits of selecting options

Stage 11: Final bargaining

- Reach agreement through incremental convergence of positions, final leaps to package settlements, develop of a consensual approach, or establishment of procedural means to reach substantive agreement.

Stage 12: Achieving formal settlement

- Identify procedural steps to operationalize the agreement
- Establish an evaluation-and-monitoring procedure
- Formalize the settlement and create enforcement-and-commitment mechanism

(source: Deutsh, 2000)

Figure 5.3 (continued)

Arbitration: is the process of third party intervention to recommend a contractual decision. This tool for resolution should not be used until both negotiation and mediation have proven unsuccessful. The best conditions for arbitration:

1. Parties are deadlocked after an attempted negotiation or mediation;
2. Parties will not have to maintain a relationship after the dispute is resolved;
3. Legal issues predominate over factual issues;
4. Parties have dramatically differing appraisals of the case's fact and how the law might apply;
5. Parties have a history of acting in bad faith in negotiations;
6. An immediate decision by a third party neutral is needed to protect the interests of a disputant.

(source: Isenhardt et. al., 2000)

Further Considerations

Theoretically, the process of resolving conflict seems self evident as do the practical tools; however there is no escape from uncertainties. Human behavior is

unpredictable. Therefore, it is important to consider the barriers, limitations and hazards to conflict resolution. Many barriers associated with effective strategies stem from competitive and destructive behaviors. For example, if disputed parties experience a sense of being over-powered a breakdown in communication is likely to occur. In addition, if disputants feel that the problem is too complex then they may lose interest or motivation to participate. The possibilities are endless to potential discursive actions; therefore practitioners or third party facilitators must be prepared to simplify and/or shift direction in communication at any given time within the process. Other potential barriers include lack of correct or sufficient information, political obstacles and funding.

As in any situation of conflict, safety should always be given consideration. Those who take leadership and third party roles are most at risk because they challenge traditional ways of thinking. Though in Northern Ireland the risk associated with resolution initiatives have been relatively low, the potential for harm still exists. “Leaders and authority figures get attacked, dismissed, silenced, and sometimes assassinated because they come to represent loss, real or perceived, to those members of the community who feel that they have gotten, or might get, the bad end of a bargain” (Heifetz, 1994). The realities of change can provoke passionate emotions and resistance. “Knowing how hard to push and when to let up are central to leadership” (Heifetz, 1994). One way to achieve this objective is to facilitate challenging issues over a longer period of time, while achieving less objectionable goals in the short term. In this approach, communities are more likely to be tolerable of change. Most importantly, being conscious of behavior and patterns of change is the most cognitive skill to possess in order to insure one’s own safety and the safety of others.

Chapter Six: Planning Principles that Support Conflict Resolution

Conflict Resolution in Planning


It is clear that agencies and professionals in the planning field have a vested interest in resolving conflict at the local and regional level. Urban planning, thus far, has been criticized for its lack of investment in anthropocentric issues. Planning agencies throughout the United Kingdom are technocratic and centralized in organizational structure. This is exhibited in plans and policies thus far that have concentrated on technical analysis in making decisions. Improvements have focused on rebuilding image. This has been appealing to middle and upper middle-income residents who benefit economically from investment, but it has been proven largely not helpful to the majority. Furthermore, planning has been ambivalent to the built environment associated with conflict. 'Peace lines' restrict community access to basic public amenities and the development of social housing lacks any variation in design. The lack of social consideration has enhanced class division, failed to stimulate local economic activities or reduce poverty rates, restricted access to public amenities and services, and further divided the large ethnic populations. From this perspective, these problems have unnecessarily sustained conflict.

The organizational problem is that Northern Ireland is notably different from the rest of the U.K., and therefore traditional planning practice is not enough to ensure successful urban development. There needs to be a greater commitment on the fundamental social issues that have largely shaped the urban community. Conflict resolution not only builds stronger relationships it builds stronger communities. If

planners were to incorporate conflict resolution strategies into their plans they would be more successful in achieving goals and objectives. The illustration (Figure 6.1) below is an example of how planners can incorporate conflict resolution theory into the traditional planning process, which will synthesize technical analysis and anthropocentric elements to create a holistic plan rather than one laden with one-sided outcomes.

Figure 6.1 represents a feasible framework for which to incorporate conflict resolution into the planning process. The inner circle is a model of the comprehensive planning process. There are five basic steps represented, which include research, goals and objectives, plan formulation, implementation, and review and revise. This model also illustrates that planning is an ongoing process, and to be effective it must flow through a continual evolution. In order for it to function effectively, all stakeholders must be identified and equally included in the planning process.

1. **Research Phase:** A fact-gathering phase that enables a planner to make knowledgeable decisions. In this phase opportunities, issues and assumptions are identified and made.
2. **Goals & Objectives Phase:** The phase where data is analyzed, community goals and objectives are clarified and formalized. Goals and objectives are often revised several times before being officially accepted.
3. **Plan Formulation Phase:** In this phase, alternative ideas are pursued to determine the most feasible means for achieving goals. Scenarios are developed to determine future patterns. A plan is then formulated based on the best alternative.
4. **Implementation Phase:** The phase where the plan is put into action.



(Source: Author, 2003)

Figure: 6.1: Concentric Model for Conflict Resolution & Planning

5. Review & Revise Phase: Once the plan has been implemented it can then be evaluated based on measurable objectives. The objectives help to determine whether the plan is meeting its intended goals. Adjustments to the plan can then be made accordingly to improve the overall performance.

The outer ring represents the appropriate resolution strategies to be utilized during the planning process. It is divided into six sections; assertion, facilitation, consensus building, negotiation and mediation, arbitration and evaluation. These sections are based upon the Raider Conflict Resolution Continuum Model (1997). Each of the six tools are located within the planning process at the phase they are likely to have the most beneficial effect, however it should be noted that they are not exclusive to their specific location within the model, and may prove to be useful at varying stages in the planning process. At the core of this model, the innermost ring (see Figure 6.1), is the central component that represents trust building. Throughout the planning process, building trust is central to effectively achieving the plan and building the foundation of stronger relationships that will continue to grow as the process is repeated.

1. **Assertion:** Located within the research phase, it is the medium between avoidance and aggression (see chapter 5 Conflict Resolution Continuum Model). It is the starting point for determining the appropriate course of action to achieve resolution, and therefore part of the discovery process.
2. **Facilitation:** This is located between the research phase and the common goals and objectives phase. Facilitation during this initial stage in plan development helps to identify common problems and interests between disputed groups. The Raider Competition and Collaboration Reframing model (see Chapter five, Figure 5.2)

provides a framework for the communication process that can help to achieve effective dialogue. This could prove to be the most influential component within the process because it is at this stage that forms the foundation of effective communication between groups.

4. **Consensus Building:** This tool is located between the common goals and objectives phase and the plan formulation phase, where third party facilitation is critical. At this point, the planning process begins to engage the larger public. This is the selling point, a chance for the practitioner to convey the benefits of the plan. In addition, it prepares the community for what lies ahead after the plan has been implemented. This is the time for readdressing concerns and effectively restating compromises and joint gains. The benefits at this stage are the most significant in the planning and resolution process. The more consensus and general acceptance of the plan the less negotiation, mediation, and arbitration are likely to take place once the plan is implemented.
6. **Negotiation & Mediation:** This stage begins after the plan formulation and before implementation of a formalized plan. This is the most sensitive phase in the planning process because it is at this stage that behaviors are most likely to change as ideas are challenged and decisions are made. Without negotiation or mediation, communication can quickly become competitive and the entire process runs the risk of failure. Planning professionals can act as facilitators to redirect and/or refocus the direction of communication. (See Chapter 5, Figure 5.3).
7. **Arbitration:** This stage begins after the plan is implemented and before or during the review and revise stage of the planning process. The amount of arbitration that

takes place is determined by the general success of the plan. Arbitration is when third party intervention is needed to settle disputes when both parties are in “deadlocked” disagreement.

6. **Evaluation:** The evaluation stage is simultaneous with the review and revise stage in the planning process. These tasks help to determine the strengths and weaknesses of both the plan and the process. The purpose is to identify areas of improvement that can be more closely monitored in the future.

Again, this model indicates how conflict resolution can be incorporated into the planning process, and what objectives it serves in addressing planning related issues while simultaneously bridging a relationship between groups who are formally opposed to one another. In addition, it brings communities into the planning process where they formally had very little or no input. Planners are able to address social concerns directly and apply technical analysis, which further strengthens the legitimacy of the plan leaving less room for criticism. Finally, planners will be able to move beyond marginalized planning and take educated risks with trust and support from their local community.

Planning with Conflict Resolution in Mind

It is I to assume that significant change can be achieved within a short period of time. It is necessary to start small and build upon the foundation of successive achievements. An inventory should be taken of current conflict resolution initiatives and forums taking place. Suggested by the number of non-profit organizations working within communities, the public is ready for a change in the unstable condition in which they live. Cross-community initiatives have already been established to facilitate dialogue between disputed groups. Following the format of Figure 6.1, there are

planning initiatives that can be used to facilitate a shift in approaching conflict issues. To begin, planners should survey organizations and individuals already engaged in the resolution process to identify commonalities and societal goals, as well as members in the public willing to participate in the process.

Once the planning process has begun, forums of communication should be opened to representative members of the public. This can help identify common concerns and non-traditional leaders to facilitate dialog among planning professional and their communities. In addition, channels of communication should flow horizontally among planning agencies to minimize disconnect between multiple projects. There are two recommendations for achieving this goal. One recommendation is to create a unit within each agency that participates in a larger unit responsible for communicating among agencies and the public with a specialization in conflict resolution. The second recommendation is to hold an annual conference for community development and planning that is specifically designed to address Northern Ireland's situation. Planning professionals, academia, politicians, community members, and other members of the public would have the opportunity to engage in conversation and learn of current initiatives and/or research to further promote planning with conflict resolution in mind.

Further action can be taken by selecting symbolic projects and incentives that addresses common concerns and have beneficial outcomes for both the Catholic and Protestant community. During open forums, participants can be encouraged to provide input into possible alternatives, solutions, and incentives. While it may not be possible to initiate every project or program, it would identify those that are appropriate for immediate action and those that could be achieved over a long-term period. For example,

eliminating a 'peace line' at an interface area that is relatively low risk to both communities would have multiple benefits. It would create access between currently restricted communities and public services, open the possibility for generating economic activity in locations previously unfeasible, and symbolize to Belfast and Northern Ireland that it is reaching an end to an era of divisiveness and conflict. Finally, shift marginalization away from planning and redirect it to extremists. Strengthening the collaborative voice of those in favor of resolving conflict will send a clear message to extremists that destructive behaviors will no longer be tolerated. The only way Belfast can succeed in marketing itself as the 'City of Culture' is by building a city and a nation based on peaceful coexistence.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis is to gain a better perspective of the role urban planning has in shifting from conflict management to conflict resolution. It does not presume to prescribe a solution to conflict in totality. It does, however, describe why urban planning agencies have a vested interest and significant influence in the process of conflict resolution. The result of a violent history shared between Catholic and Protestant ethnic/religious groups has deteriorated any trust between both communities and public institutions. Many technical complications that urban planners face in Northern Ireland are directly linked to strategies that attempt to cope with anthropocentric problems. As a result, it is difficult to resolve issues critical to a successful planning process.

Northern Ireland practices planning under the same guidelines as those established for all nations in the United Kingdom, and many planning policies are established through one centralized government. What is good for one location may not hold true for another due to varying circumstances. Therefore, planners in Northern Ireland must move beyond traditional practice and seek innovative techniques to be successful. Incorporating conflict resolution strategies into the planning process builds relationships, and therefore opens the way to new planning opportunities.

Furthermore, for the planning process to be successful, change must occur in the centralized organizational structure of planning agencies and in the planning process. At this writing, the flow of information between planning agencies and the community is highly restrictive. Community members are hesitant to establish any trustworthy relationship if information is subjective to their needs. It is critical that information and

communication flow in both directions. This can be accomplished through policies that articulate a collective community voice. By empowering nontraditional community leaders as facilitators between their community and planning agencies information can flow horizontally back and forth between groups until all parties are satisfied with the final results. Decentralizing the government's role in decision making will create a positive step towards gaining public trust, which is at the core of conflict resolution.

As indicated through this research, the socio-economic dynamics of the population most acutely affected by the confines of planning are those of low and moderate income living in and around interface areas. These communities suffer higher poverty levels, lower educational attainment, and poor housing. In addition, these locations are divided by 'peace lines' designed to minimize conflict between opposing communities. These physical barriers limit access to essential public services and economic opportunities. Inter-community and cross-community programs have been established to promote awareness and acceptance of both ethnic/religious groups. Some organizations go so far as to resolve conflict between communities. These arenas have made a substantial effort to bring conflict to an end, and the public seems generally receptive to these efforts. Logically, planning agencies are well situated to establish relationships within this arena to further promote community development while concurrently expanding the capabilities of resolving conflict. A shift from technocratic function in planning to a community consensus based approach would ultimately create a shift from managing conflict to resolving it at a local level.

The most predominant and challenging planning strategy is the creation of 'peace lines' (Murtagh, 1995), which have divided communities in the Belfast urban area in an

attempt to minimize sectarian violence between Catholic and Protestant ethnic groups. Ironically, this has the potential to be the most symbolic initiative to bridge successful planning and conflict resolution. Targeting a 'peace line' as a community development project could have profound implications not only for enhancing socio-economic opportunities but also as an example that peaceful co-existence is possible.

Following the model in Figure 6.1 of chapter six, a collaborative multi-agency and community consensus based project could be established which would bring everyone together in order to define the future of one interface area. Members of both the Catholic and Protestant communities could define their joint needs and concerns through negotiation and mediation, while members from a collective representation of agencies could guide communication through their own areas of specialization. The end product would be to create a collective co-existing community. During this process, new innovative incentives for the interface community could be established as a reward of accomplishment, as well as further community partnership and act as incentive for other communities who want to participate. The process is designed to start locally and grow nationally, and as it does the issue between national territorial ownership increasingly becomes inconsequential because the residents associate themselves more within a co-existent community. Ideally, Northern Ireland becomes one independent and collective nation based on internal resolution.

The city of Belfast has indicated that they wish to promote themselves as the 'City of Culture'. It tried to do so in the past through redesigning its image, however plans did not take into account social considerations, and any attempts to implement this vision were criticized openly. Though, if Belfast was to incorporate an image based upon

resolved differences it could be more freely accepted as a 'City of Culture'. This idea could then be sold globally, and Northern Ireland could promote itself as an international center for peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Belfast, instead of capitalizing on the 'terror tourist', could create an industry around peace building, functioning as model for other contested communities in the world today and in the future. Revenue generated from such activities could go towards funding for a local resolution incentives program, therefore communities reap the benefits that they sow.

Further Research

This thesis has examined how conflict resolution strategies can be incorporated into the planning process in Belfast in order to resolve problems associated with projects that were previously design to manage conflict. It has only examined problems associated within the Belfast urban area, however conflict extends into rural areas of the country as well. It would most certainly be more difficult to promote the same strategies in such remote settings. An examination of how to incorporate or initiate a strategy for conflict resolution in these areas would be beneficial for providing a nation-wide agenda.

This study provides only a brief summary of the socio-economic demographics of Belfast's interface areas. Further study in the spatial distribution of ethnic population could highlight areas of demographic change and the areas most in need of housing, which is one of Belfast's most immediate concerns. In addition, indicators could be appropriately identified or created to determine the most feasible 'peace line' removal project to initiate. Such indicators could include but are not limited to per capita income, educational attainment, household demographics (i.e. age, size, gender), ethnicity, crime, and health.

Finally, a financial feasibility study to determine the cost and benefits of implementing a planning project proposed here would be advantageous. There have been extensive studies on how 'conflict' has generated revenue in Belfast, and how the middle and upper-middle income residents have benefited. The reality is that for resolution to occur, the monetary benefits must be obvious, or those who benefit from conflict will create rifts that hinder the overall success in any resolution-focused project. Meeting these complex challenges and achieving a truly integrated society would provide a quality of life that surpasses the expectations of the citizen's of Belfast.

Hypothetical Example

A hypothetical example of removing a 'peace line' illustrates the functionary purpose of the model in Figure 6.1. A 'peace line' is a symbolic form in Northern Ireland because it is a constant reminder of the conflict between the Catholic and Protestant ethnic/religious groups. The Cluan Place 'peace line' in the Balleymacarrett community has been chosen to be removed (See Figure 4.5). It has been chosen for several significant reasons. First, it is one of the smallest in length and therefore economically more feasible to remove. Second, it is located in a community that is 60% Protestant (see Table 2.1), meaning that there are a significant number of Catholic residents already integrated within the same community. Furthermore, there has a larger female population within the community, and as stated earlier women are more open and accepting of the opposite ethnic/religious group. Finally, as illustrated in the religious distribution map on page xvii and in Figure 4.5, Balleymacarrett is located in close proximity to downtown, and is visible location for a symbolic site for conflict resolution.

In the first phase of this hypothetical planning and conflict resolution process planners would identify inter and cross community groups as well as nontraditional leaders who were willing to act as facilitators between their community and the planning agencies. Next, planners would identify key support service providers within the area that have a vested interest in the process. These providers would include but were not limited to schools, public housing, waste management, fire and police. During this initial research stage, an inventory of the community's current conditions and socio-economic structure would be conducted. This would be accomplished through voluntary action groups, who were representatives of the community. This process is key to building trust and expanding perceptions on issues. Participants would be chosen based on their degree of knowledgeable about their own neighborhoods. Nontraditional community leaders will seek information and in so doing will strengthen their relationship with neighbors.

The research by planners and the voluntary action groups would provide a foundation to begin the process to identify common goals and objectives. The planning agency would arrange for a series of charetts over several month starting first in established segregated neighborhoods. The public was encouraged to attend the meetings to discuss their needs and concerns. As neighborhood strengths and weaknesses are discussed at the charetts, the facilitator will direct the discussion to similar discussions recorded in other neighborhoods. Participants will be asked to identify common concerns and goals. Eventually, groups of neighborhood representatives for each side of the barrier will be asked to meeting to discuss their perspectives from their side of the barrier and identify common issues of concern. The exercise would then be extended to compare perspectives from either side of the barrier and define a set of goals.

Lets assume that citizens of Balleymacarett were able to identify three common goals to be considered when removing the 'peace line'. First, improve the standard of residential housing along Claun Place. Second, create opportunity for more commercial development within the surrounding community. Finally, improve security within Balleymacarett's residential areas.

With these goals and objectives in mind, through a second series of 'nested' charettts, participants would be divided into diverse subgroups and given the task to formulate alternatives to meet the assigned goal and objective. A planner would be assigned to facilitate group discussion, to clarify jargon, keep the process on track, and mitigate perceived differences of opinion. Lets also assume that the groups managed this process well and were able to formulate a number of possible alternatives. Each group had a chance to present their ideas to the rest of the participants, which were challenged through a series of questions and comments. This then becomes a foundation to create a cross-community association with local planning agencies to begin to set a specific agenda to address common issues of concern and define steps to achieve common goals. A key is to build the trust by taking viable steps that result in tangible results than can symbolize the possibilities. If accomplished successfully than the 'peace line' can be replaced by a vibrant commercial district or public park, which symbolizes the interaction between both ethnic groups.

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Appendix

United Kingdom Public Records Office Release: Public Records of 1972

Public Records of 1972

“On 1 January 2003 the Public Record Office (PRO) in Kew released a number of government documents under the 'thirty year rule'. Some of these documents were related to events in Northern Ireland during 1972. The documents are listed in chronological order. “

“Following the introduction of Internment on 9 August 1971 there had been a large increase in the level of violence in Northern Ireland. Violence continued to increase during 1972 and by the end of the year almost 500 people had died making 1972 the worst year of the conflict. 1972 also saw such events as: Bloody Sunday; the end of the Stormont government and the introduction of Direct Rule; Bloody Friday; and Operation Motorman.”

(CAIN, 2003)

Ref. A01005

PRIME MINISTER

Political Issues: Inter-Party Talks

The immediate question concerns the nature of the replies to the letters which the Home Secretary has received from Mr. Callaghan and Sir Harry Nicholas about the scope of the proposed talks. Mr. Callaghan's letter simply asks for confirmation that they would be "open-ended", while Sir Harry Nicholas says more explicitly that internment is an impediment to the success of any political initiative. The Government's reply should presumably confirm that any talks would be "open-ended" in the sense of being without prejudice and without commitment on the part of any of the participants. But should it not add that this means, so far as the Government are concerned, that there can be no question of ending internment unilaterally, i.e. so long as violence persists?

2. If so, however, the prospects for the talks are not bright. Dr. Paisley has indicated that he will not take part if unification is on the agenda; and, despite some recent haverings by Mr. Fitt, it seems fairly clear that the SDLP will not participate if the Government say that they are not prepared to end internment. This is not necessarily an unsatisfactory position for the Government, at least in the short term, since public opinion is not likely to agree that the Government should let loose a lot of gunmen and terrorists in return for no more than a promise merely to take part in inter-Party talks without any assurance that they will have a successful outcome. And, provided that internment itself is properly managed (and this is for discussion under a later item on the agenda) and that the Army seem to be continuing to gain the upper hand over the IRA, the Government can probably afford to rest in this position at least for the time being.

3. But it is not a long-term policy; and sooner or later the Government will be driven to try to devise some new political initiative which offers better prospects of success than inter-Party talks as at present envisaged. Here we confront the old dilemma - should any new initiative be based on the fundamental premises that the Border remains intact and that the Stormont system continues; or should it envisage some basic modification in these assumptions? Hitherto, Ministers have judged that it would not be possible to modify either of them without risking the fall of Mr. Faulkner's Government and the inevitable need, as a result, to introduce direct rule.

These arguments have no less force today; and I imagine that Ministers will continue to wish to find some means of maintaining the Stormont system if at all possible. Is it possible to do so in essentials, while taking a new initiative at the right moment?

4. In this connection the memorandum which the Alliance Party have recently sent you (Mr. Howard Smith's letter of 4th January to Mr. Gregson) goes to the root of the matter when it says that "[The Catholics] felt that once the IRA are beaten the Catholic population will be forcibly prevented from securing any reforms. Catholics simply do not believe that when the IRA are defeated reforms will follow. No promises or assurances will convince them of this". If this is an accurate diagnosis of the position (and it surely is), we must concentrate on trying to convince the Catholics that when the IRA are finally worsted - but not until then - reforms will be effected. And the only way of demonstrating this would be by means of legislation at Westminster, putting the full force of the authority of the United Kingdom Parliament behind the changes. As regards the content of the legislation, the Committee's discussion of GEN 47(71) 7 and 8 on 13th December suggested that any attempt to redistribute Stormont's functions or to transfer responsibility for law and order to Westminster would be liable to leave Stormont so shorn of effective power and authority that Mr. Faulkner's Government would fall and we should find that we had merely precipitated the situation which we were trying to avoid. But the new memorandum on "Constitutional Devices to Protect the Minority" (GEN 47(71) 9) indicates a possible alternative approach - i. e. legislation at Westminster guaranteeing to the Catholic minority a reasonable share in representation not only in Parliament but in the Government, and incorporating blocking devices to prevent its purposes from being frustrated by the majority. It is possible to conceive of such legislation's being further strengthened by provisions safeguarding the minority against "administrative" discrimination e.g. by prescribing that a certain number of posts on public authorities must be filled by Catholics and cannot be filled by Protestants. And the law would need to prescribe very severe penalties indeed for any breach of these requirements.

5. A system of this kind would involve some diminution in the authority of the Government at Stormont; and it would be cumbersome to work. But other countries have been driven, in similar circumstances,

to adopt devices of this kind; we ourselves are proposing to have recourse to this kind of solution in Rhodesia; and the Stormont system as such could still continue. It is just possible, therefore, that, if the Government said publicly that internment would not be ended so long as violence persisted but that, if violence ceased, they would be prepared to consider ending internment and to legislate on the above lines, moderate opinion might be sufficiently rallied to compel Mr. Faulkner's more extreme supporters to accept this degree of amendment of the Stormont system. It would, of course, be highly resented and actively opposed by the Protestant Right Wing; but, if it was the price of preserving the separate Parliament and some continuing degree of autonomy, local opinion might decide that it was a price worth paying. It would at least be no less unpromising an initiative in the medium term than the proposed inter-Party talks.

6. If there is anything in this suggestion, it follows that it would be worth developing the suggestion in GEN 47(71) 9, preferably not by drafting a Bill (which might obscure the issues rather than clarifying them) but by producing more detailed proposals for Ministers to discuss before any drafting of legislation is put in hand. If the project proved, on further examination, to be worth trying, it would then be necessary to consider how and when to launch it and how to obtain for it the maximum of support, in the South no less than in the North.

7. For the rest, it was suggested by Mr. Robin Chichester-Clark at a meeting with the Foreign Secretary before Christmas that there would be advantage in an adjournment debate in which he and others could criticise the Government of the Republic for its failure to co-operate in denying the IRA a safe base for operations. At that time you were disposed to think that there might be benefit in this. But other Ministers had reservations; and you may think that in the present political climate in Dublin the balance of advantage for the time being is in favour of dissuading Mr. Chichester-Clark from such a debate.

8. Finally, under this head there is the question of the Government's reply to the case that has been raised against us under the Human Rights Convention Is all in hand?

The Security Situation

9. The Committee will wish to hear the usual reports from the CGS in relation to Belfast, Londonderry and the Border. A decision is needed on the renewal of the ban on processions, which is due to expire next month.

E.R.

This should surely be renewed - and enforced? The relatively gentle handling of the anti-internment march on Christmas Day was perhaps to be excused by the nature of the occasion. But, if we are putting our money on Mr. Faulkner's survival, we cannot afford to expose him indefinitely to the accusation that he is using kid gloves to deal with provocation and intimidation. As you have yourself observed, the ringleaders of such marches ought to be prosecuted with the minimum of delay. (In this connection the dissidents' latest tactic of using children as decoys and shields could prove a serious obstacle to an attempt to deal resolutely with protest and obstruction. How does the CGS advise that the soldiers should react?).

Internment

10. Several points need attention:-

(a) Are the plans for enlarging accommodation for internees and for their custody going forward satisfactorily, bearing in mind the advantage of segregating the more dangerous internees from the less?

(b) Can arrangements be made for the "rehabilitation" of the internees? I understand that General Ford put the point to you during your visit to Belfast before Christmas. (But what does "rehabilitation" mean? And who is to pay for it?).

(c) How do we stand on improvements in the internment procedure? The Northern Ireland Government have a number of proposals under consideration, including the suggestion that the appeals tribunal should not only be used to review the cases of individuals already interned but should also have its functions brought forward in time in order that internment orders should be made as a result of its recommendations rather than simply on the recommendation of the RUC. We gather that this particular proposal (which originates with the Attorney General of Northern Ireland, but without the benefit of consultation with his colleagues!) is not likely to be well received at Stormont. But the Northern Ireland Government have been asked to consider it and ought to be pressed hard. Prima facie the idea seems to have a great deal of merit.

(d) If we can secure a lull in terrorist activity, it would probably be no bad thing to release some of the less harmful internees. Indeed, their release might facilitate the institution of criminal prosecutions in the normal way. But it is important that the less harmful element should

E.R.

be identified well in advance in order that, when the opportunity arises, action can be taken quickly. This ties in with the "segregation" point at (a) above.

(e) Sir Philip Allen will be able to report on the position of Sir Edmund Compton, who has said that he is not, after all, willing to operate standing machinery for the investigation of complaints of violence against detainees and internees.

BN
for Burke/Turner

10th January, 1972

MESSAGE NO 3 OF 30 JANUARY 1972

NO 10 TO CHEQUERS

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM LORD BRIDGES TO PRIME MINISTER

LONDONDERRY RIOT

LATEST CONFIRMED REPORTS RECEIVED IN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ARE THAT ABOUT FIVE PEOPLE KILLED IN LONDONDERRY THIS AFTERNOON AND A FURTHER TWELVE IN HOSPITAL. THEY ARE NOT ABLE TO CONFIRM REPORT CARRIED BY AGENCIES THAT TWELVE WERE KILLED; THIS IS BASED ON A STATEMENT MADE BY SPOKESMAN FOR A LONDONDERRY HOSPITAL, WHO SAID THAT THE TWELVE HAD BEEN BROUGHT IN DEAD WITH GUNSHOT WOUNDS AND ALL WERE IN THEIR EARLY 20S.

ACCORDING TO THE MOD, TROOPS WERE FIRED ON BY SNIPERS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE MARCH. THE ARMY RETURNED FIRE AT THOSE SHOOTING AT THEM, NOT INTO THE CROWD AS MISS DEVLIN SAYS.

IF ANY FURTHER REPORTS REACH THE MOD FROM ARMY UNIT COMMANDERS THIS EVENING, WE WILL TELEPRINT THE GIST TO YOU.

MESSAGE ENDS

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of Sir Burke Trend (Printer)

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 9

CABINET

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

CM(72) 5th Conclusions, Minute 3

Thursday 3 February 1972 at 11.30 am

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE said that the Army welcomed the Inquiry which the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Widgery, had agreed to undertake under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 into the events in Londonderry on Sunday 30 January. It was to be feared that serious disorders, with a risk of a further loss of life, might result from the marches planned to take place in and around Newry on Sunday 6 February. Contingents from Dundalk, which lay close across the Border, were intending to take part. The dispositions made by the security forces involved in this case the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), whom it had been impracticable to deploy in this way in Londonderry; the Army would be kept in reserve to cover points which the RUC might not be able to hold.

THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up a brief discussion, said that there might be advantage in ensuring that it was more widely known that, as the Lord Chancellor had already informed the House of Lords, it had been Lord Widgery's own proposal that he should conduct the Inquiry alone. This might help to forestall any suggestion that the Government had appointed a single individual in order to avoid the possibility of a divergence of view such as had arisen between Lord Parker and Mr John Boyd-Carpenter MP on the one hand and Lord Gardiner on the other hand during their recent Inquiry into the procedures governing interrogation. Lord Widgery judged that his own Inquiry was simply into questions of fact; that he would be able to form an opinion by questioning eye-witnesses without the need for expert or other assistance; and that he could conclude the Inquiry more quickly if he conducted it alone. The Roman Catholic residents of Londonderry might not be prepared to co-operate with him. But he would have power to summon witnesses sub poena; and it could not be convincingly argued that the Lord Chief Justice of England lacked impartiality. As to the marches planned in and around Newry, it was desirable that every influence should be brought to bear to prevent their taking place. He had himself written to the Roman Catholic Archbishop

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of Westminster and to the Roman Catholic Primate of All Ireland; and HM Ambassador in Dublin was delivering a personal message to the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic, Mr Lynch, asking him in particular to dissuade citizens of the Republic from taking part,

The Cabinet -

1. Took note, with approval, of the Prime Minister's summing up of this part of their discussion.

Political
Section

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, Mr Faulkner, had been invited to London to discuss the political situation on the following day. There were reports that Mr Lynch and the leaders of the Fine Gael and Labour Parties in the Republic might also wish to come to London to meet British Ministers. If such a request was made and could be deemed to be for the purpose of serious discussion rather than mere propaganda, it would be unwise to refuse. It was desirable to lower the political tension in the Republic, if possible, particularly in view of Mr Lynch's precarious position and the absence of any successor who could exert a moderating influence. The situation was being kept under constant review by the Ministers principally concerned; in particular possible forms of political initiative were being carefully appraised.

In discussion there was general agreement on the importance of maintaining a broad base of support in Great Britain for the Government's policy. A growing section of public opinion wished to see British troops withdrawn from Northern Ireland. It was sometimes forgotten, however, that the Army was the Army of the United Kingdom and was not operating in a foreign or colonial territory. Moreover, to threaten withdrawal might create an expectation that the Government's resolution was weakening, while to carry it out could only result in extensive bloodshed in Northern Ireland, in which the Roman Catholic element of the population might well be the main sufferers. Before the Army garrison could be reduced to a significantly lower level an acceptable state of law and order would have to be restored and a satisfactory political settlement would need to be achieved. Nevertheless, in order to retain a broad measure of public support for the maintenance of large military forces in Northern Ireland, it was desirable that movement towards some political solution of the conflict should be seen to be in prospect. It was also probable that there would be increasing international pressure in favour of a political initiative.

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RESTRICTED

NORTHERN IRELAND: CURRENT SITUATION REPORT NO 118
14 APRIL 1972

CSM
17/4

Incidents during the past 24 hours

Terrorist activity was at a comparatively high level throughout the Province with a concerted bombing campaign by the IRA apparently designed to impress on the Catholic population their determination to continue the campaign of violence. There was a total of 24 bomb explosions and a further five bombs were defused by Army disposal experts.

2. 18 of the bomb explosions were in the rural areas. They included a bomb attack on the Council Office at Newry, where a security guard was shot in the legs; an explosion in a derelict house near Crossmaglen in which three soldiers were slightly injured; an attack on electricity pylons near Crossmaglen and an attack on the Cattle Marketing Office at Newtownhamilton. In addition four other bombs were defused by Army bomb disposal experts.

3. There were three explosions in Belfast. The Smithfield Bus Station was extensively damaged by a 50 - 100 lb bomb; a car hire firm in Grosvenor Road was also seriously damaged by a 100 lb bomb; and a 15 lb bomb caused minor damage to the Beechlawn Hotel, Dunmurry. A malicious fire at the University Air Squadron building in Belfast caused four civilian casualties, a fourth bomb, in a car in Corporation Street, was dealt with by a trained soldier firing a Carl Gustav anti-tank rocket with an inert warhead at the car under the supervision of a bomb disposal expert: the first operational use of this technique and a considerable success. Only ten per cent of the 50 lb charge exploded, causing very little damage, the other 90 per cent being scattered harmlessly.

4. There were three explosions in Londonderry, though no casualties resulted.

5. There were 14 shooting incidents in the Province. In Belfast

/troops

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troops were fired on three times, returned fire once and opened fire on a gunman once. In one of the incidents, a soldier was slightly injured. In Londonderry there were six shooting incidents at the security forces. Fire was returned twice and it is believed that one gunman was hit. There were four shooting incidents in the rural areas. Troops were fired on three times, once from across the border near Garrison, Co. Fermanagh. In the fourth incident an ex-B Special was fired on near Newtownhamilton but was not injured.

6. Other incidents in the Province included a peaceful demonstration in Belfast by 500 Protestant women outside Crumlin Gaol against the release of internees. Two wanted arrests were made in Belfast. There was the usual hooligan activity in both Belfast and Londonderry. There were three armed robberies in the rural areas.

7. Journalists at the Europa Hotel, Belfast have been told that Frank McManus and Bernadette Devlin are to hold a press conference at twelve o'clock today at which an important announcement is to be made.

D. R. Fildes

(A.W. STEPHENS)
Ministry of Defence

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~~RESTRICTED~~



SECRET & PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTER

PM/72/10

Northern Ireland

I really dislike Direct Rule for Northern Ireland because I do not believe that they are like the Scots or the Welsh and doubt if they ever will be. The real British interest would I think be served best by pushing them towards a United Ireland rather than tying them closer to the United Kingdom.

Our own parliamentary history is one long story of trouble *in the /ind*

2. I am sure that the Home Secretary is right to say that we can not go on as we are and his plan is aimed to secure a new and reformed Stormont. I fear however that the timescale in which we have been thinking for political consultations will mean that once the pattern of a Secretary of State in command of security has lasted for two years or so we shall not get away from direct rule. Would it be possible if we have to agree to prorogation to give a time limit (say six months) for an agreed political solution with notice that if it is not agreed we would impose our own solution and require a general election for the Stormont Parliament to be held upon it? I think that the odds are that the Northern Irish would not boycott such an election and that a different political pattern in Northern Ireland would emerge.

3. It seems to me that it could give us a breather, that it might provide a solution short of direct rule and that if it

SECRET & PERSONAL

/did not

SECRET & PERSONAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, S.W.1.

13 March, 1972

47/4

did not it would be easier than it is now to accept
the inevitable.
I am copying this minute to the Home Secretary,
the Defence Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
Lord President of the Council and the Secretary of the Cabinet.

SECRET & PERSONAL



Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T103/72

RECORD OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. PAULMER,
PRIME MINISTER OF NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE PRIME MINISTER
AT 4.15 p.m. ON WEDNESDAY 15 MARCH 1972

Greetings exchanged.

P.M. The situation is that we have now reached the stage where we have carefully considered everything you have said to us and we have done a complete review of our own position and now we would like to go over it all with you again. And what I was wondering was whether you could come over here on Wednesday next week which would give us a chance to get our Budget out of the way. Then we could spend a day or as much of the day as you can spare going over the whole ground. I don't know whether that would fit in with your plans.

Mr. F. Yes it would perfectly. It would help me a lot - I don't know whether it is possible - if you can give me anything in writing before that so that I can prepare for what I am going to talk about.

P.M. Well, we did consider that, because of the note in your own letter to me. And we really felt that there was so much from the point of view of the general points that is really very difficult to put down on a piece of paper.

Mr. F. I understand that.

P.M. And the other thing is whether, again in view of what you said in your last few words, whether you would like to bring one or two people with you.

Mr. F. I would like to think about that. Would you actually want to come to decisions that day for

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

immediate announcement?

P.M. Well, I always said that we would have consultations with you before we finally settled anything for announcement. So I was regarding this as a good 'going over the ground'. It rather depends on where we get to as to whether there are decisions for announcement immediately or not.

Mr. F. Well, you see, provided that we were not actually going to reach firm conclusions and announcing that day, I would not be too concerned either about having something in advance or about bringing anyone with me.

P.M. It is really just a question as to whether you think it would be helpful for you and for them, as I shall have the normal colleagues with me.

Mr. F. It might well be, but I would like to think about that.

P.M. Well, will you turn it over, and then you can let me know.

Mr. F. Right.

P.M. But they would be very welcome, if you would like to.

Mr. F. Right.

P.M. Then I think perhaps I would like to say tomorrow morning at our usual time that you will be coming.

Mr. F. Yes. When you announce that I am coming, how would you phrase that - for consultations?

P.M. That is right. Well, we will go ahead on that basis.

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Prime Minister

NOTE OF A MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA

On the instructions of the Secretary of State I met representatives of the Provisional IRA at 3 pm on Tuesday, 20 June. The meeting took place at Ballyarnett, a house near the Donegal border owned by Colonel M W McCorkell. The Colonel and Mrs McCorkell were in the house at the time.

2. The IRA representatives were Mr David O'Connell and Mr Gerard Adams. I was accompanied by Mr Frank Steele.

3. Before the discussions proper started I was introduced to a third person, Mr P J McGrory who was described as a solicitor and a wholly independent person. It had been arranged that I should carry with me a note signed by the Secretary of State to say that I was an authorised representative. This note is in the following terms:

"The bearer of this note, Mr P J Woodfield, is a senior official in my Department. He has full authority to explain my position on the three points which have been put to me.

He is being accompanied by Mr Steele, another official in my Department.

(signed) William Whitelaw
Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland"

Mr McGrory's function appeared to be to scrutinise this note and by virtue of his legal powers he pronounced it authentic and then withdrew.

4. We began the meeting with a statement from me outlining the position of the Provisional IRA as reported to the Secretary of State which was as follows:

The IRA were prepared to call an indefinite cease fire if they could be satisfied that the Secretary of State would accept the demand of certain convicted prisoners for "political status"; that he would immediately order the cessation of all harassment of the IRA; and that he would be prepared after the cease fire had been shown to be effective to meet representatives of the Provisional IRA.

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5. They did not directly challenge the accuracy of this as their position. Turning to the specific matters which they raised I said that the Secretary of State could not concede the demand for political status for convicted prisoners. Quite apart from any other considerations, this was not a concept known to the law and the Secretary of State could therefore not give effect to it. He was however prepared to consider representations from any quarter about specific matters affecting the treatment of prisoners and had in fact already made certain arrangements which were sufficiently satisfactory to the prisoners themselves for them to have called off their hunger strike as had been announced on the news. I suggested that the substance of what was being asked for under this head was virtually the position as it now was.

6. Mr O'Connell said that he broadly accepted this, but there was some doubt as to whether the report that the hunger strike had been called off was true. He asked if I would at once telephone the Governor of Belfast Prison and ask for a named prisoner to come to the telephone to give a personal report to Mr O'Connell on whether or not the hunger strike had been called off.

7. I pointed out that it had been agreed that our meeting should be completely secret and that for me to do what he asked would cause an immediate leak and that there was no prospect that he would be able to get the Governor to bring the prisoner to the telephone to talk to Mr O'Connell.

8. I then turned to the second question which had been put - if a cease fire were called would the Secretary of State stop the harassment of the Provisional IRA. I said that harassment was a vague term and meant different things to different people. After discussion of various examples I said that it seemed that what the two representatives were asking for was an assurance that the security forces would not take the opportunity of a cease fire to pick up men whom they had been unable to get while the campaign was on. They agreed that this was their position and I said that the Secretary of State was prepared to give an assurance on this point which would mean that raids, searches and arrests to look for people wanted for their past activities would not take place. They raised one subsidiary point; many members of their organisation remained in fear of being attacked and had been accustomed to carrying concealed side-arms. If they were stopped and found to be carrying arms would they be arrested? I said that this was a question which I would report back but that the object was to produce a situation as soon as possible when people no longer thought they needed to carry firearms and that if persons were going about on normal peaceful business they would not be subject to arbitrary stopping and searching.

9. The third question which had been put was whether the Secretary of State would agree to a personal meeting with representatives after the cease fire. On this I said that the answer was yes but that the Secretary of State must first be satisfied that the cease fire was effective and that he must be the judge on this question. They accepted this and there was then a good deal of haggling about the time that a genuine cease fire would have to last before the meeting took place. Eventually we settled on ten days, the minimum which the Secretary of State had authorized me to agree to. I said that this period of ten days would need to include two weekends but I did not make it an absolute condition.

10. I had previously arranged with Mr Steele that after these opening exchanges we would bring our discussions into the form of a normal conversation with the object of drawing out the IRA representatives and helping each other out if the discussions reached awkward corners. At this point the IRA representatives began to raise a number of other matters and the exchanges became more informal as planned. On each of the points raised and recorded below we explained the publicly stated position of HMG where relevant, emphasized that we had no authority to negotiate, said we would accurately report their points to S of S, but that none of them could be additional conditions for a cease fire. All this they said they understood and accepted.

11. They asked whether a cease fire would be followed rapidly by the withdrawal of the Army from Catholic areas, particularly in Belfast, and whether their patrolling could be confined to main roads. We replied that the British Army is not deployed on the streets of the cities of Northern Ireland because this was where the British Government wanted them to be. The object was a cessation of violence and intercommunal peace and if that were achieved there would be no need for a permanent Army presence. They did not dissent from this but said that if there could be a rapid reduction in Army activity this would bring dividends and would create a new atmosphere.

12. The next matter raised was a request for the early release from prison of one prominent Catholic (McKee who led the Belfast Prison hunger strike) and one or possibly two Protestants. They said that all three of these persons had been framed. We said that the request for any review of sentence on the grounds of miscarriage of justice would be conveyed to the Secretary of State but that these could not be matters for bargaining nor ones in which any early decision could be expected.

13. The IRA then asked if the Northern Ireland Office would be prepared to use their good offices to introduce them to representatives of the UDA. They clearly recognised the UDA as a potentially dangerous power centre in Northern Ireland and implied that if a meeting could be effected they might get along better than some people would expect.

14. We on our side raised a number of points designed to ensure that if a cease fire was declared it should be effective. First we told them not to draw any immediate and irrevocable conclusions from any action by the security forces which appeared to them to be contrary to the Secretary of State's assurances. If they thought they were being tricked they should make immediate contact with the Northern Ireland Office and put their grievances and wait for our response. If they remained dissatisfied they would have to draw for themselves the consequences of reverting to violent activity but if they were sincere in their desire for a cease fire and an end to violence they should be concerned to ensure that it did not start again by a misunderstanding. They welcomed this and an initial line of contact (through the former office of the UK Representative) was arranged. They went on to say that they would welcome local points of contact and they for their part believed that once the cease fire had been shown to be genuine they would have no difficulty in liaising with the Army by pointing out possible danger spots. They said that although they could enforce a cease fire on the part of their officers and volunteers they were worried about the activities of teenagers and school children. They admitted that violence against the Army frequently started by stone throwing by children and that the opportunity was then taken to escalate the violence to shooting; they offered to submit a list of places where they thought the risk was greatest and asked if the Army could avoid them at times when children tended to congregate. We replied that any specific proposal genuinely designed to help would be carefully considered but that there could be no undertaking that the Army would simply avoid being in areas listed by the IRA.

15. We next pointed out the danger of any pre-set booby traps. A cease fire would be completely wrecked if it were followed by a booby trap killing British soldiers; it would be no adequate defence to say that it had been set before the cease fire. They took note of this point appearing to recognise its force but not knowing whether or not they had any such time bombs.

16. We then said that a number of members of their organisation were well known not only by name but by sight and that the prospects of the cease fire leading to permanent peace depended very largely on these people lying low; we gave one or two examples and they replied that if people of this kind were to strut about in Protestant areas this would be an act of provocation.

17. The meeting had now lasted 2½ hours and Mr O'Connell and Mr Adams then asked if they could have a short period on their own. When we rejoined them they went over the ground and confirmed the basis on which the discussion had taken place, namely that we were only authorised, except when referring to HMG's publicly stated position, to deal with the three questions which had been put in advance to the Secretary of State. They said that having met us they were personally satisfied that where we said we were authorised to speak expressly on behalf of the Secretary of State we were so authorised: but other members of their organisation had not met us and they said that in the whole context of Irish history they were bound to fear that they might be being tricked. Would it be possible for the Secretary of State to set out in writing his response to the three questions which had been put? We replied that for the Secretary of State to send them a letter of this kind would be politically wholly impossible; he would have no control over the letter or the use made of it. They saw the validity of this and it was eventually proposed that Mr McGrory who had been present when we first met should be invited to call at a convenient place and see a written statement signed by the Secretary of State covering the three points. When the three points were once again summarised the reference to the political prisoners had been dropped and a new one introduced - namely that "liaison would be established, initially between a member of the Secretary of State's staff, and a representative of the IRA, with the object of making the cease fire work". As this was an arrangement which the Secretary of State had instructed us to obtain if possible we made no comment on the fact that it had now become a condition by the IRA to a cease fire. We said that we could not commit the Secretary of State to this proposal to use Mr McGrory but that we would immediately convey it to him.

interviewed
18. We then broached the question of the timing of a cease fire. Mr O'Connell suggested the weekend. We emphasised strongly the dangers of delay. Mr O'Connell replied that he and Mr Adams were not potentates and would have to refer back and that they would need some time to give advance warning down the line. We were not able at this stage to get them to agree to advance the time before Friday.

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19. Finally, we asked in what terms the cease fire would be announced being particularly anxious that it should not, even by inadvertance, disclose any of the matters which we had been discussing. They appeared open to advice on this point and I therefore dictated the following formula, which both of them took down and said would be satisfactory:

"We are ordering an indefinite cease fire to take effect from in the confident belief that the Secretary of State will make an exceptional response to this exceptional measure as he has said he will do in his public statements."

20. As we were about to leave I asked Mr O'Connell what the size and composition of the IRA delegation to meet the S of S might be. He bristled a little and said they could not accept any dictation on this point. I said that the Secretary of State was going a long way in agreeing to meet them, that if they wanted their new move to be a success they should have regard to his position and that it would be better not to include people who were well known persons and faces; in particular it would make it much easier if Mr McStiofain were not included. Mr O'Connell again said that he could not enter into an arrangement to exclude him but added that he might or might not attend in a tone of voice which suggested that there was considerable doubt whether he would be willing to come along.

21. The meeting had lasted $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours. As this was the first encounter with the Provisional IRA and as the meeting took place in an informal and relaxed atmosphere it may be of interest to record an impression of the two representatives who came.

22. Mr O'Connell is about forty and Mr Adams is twenty-three. There is no doubt whatever that these two at least genuinely want a cease fire and a permanent end to violence. Whatever pressures in Northern Ireland have brought them to this frame of mind there is also little doubt that now that the prospect of peace is there they have a strong personal incentive to try and get it. They let drop several remarks showing that the life of the Provisional IRA man on the run is not a pleasant one.

23. Their appearance and manner was respectable and respectful - they easily referred to Mr Whitelaw as "the Secretary of State" and they addressed me from time to time as "Sir". They made no bombastic defence of their past and made no attacks on the British Government, the British Army or any other communities or bodies in Northern Ireland. Their response to every argument put to them was reasonable and moderate. Their behaviour and attitude appeared to bear no relation to the indiscriminate campaigns of bombing and shooting in which they have both been prominent leaders.

Distribution:

Mr Platt
Sir V Field
Mr Cairncross
PS to Lord Windlesham
PS to Mr Channon

W.
F J WOODFIELD
21 June 1972

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PERIMETER

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE



MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1

TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 7022

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MO 19/3

26th July, 1972

Dear Christopher,

NORTHERN IRELAND: DRAFT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Further to my letter earlier today enclosing a copy of CGS' paper on Army Operations in Northern Ireland, I am now sending you a copy of two draft amendments to the Rules of Engagement which the CGS agreed informally with the Attorney General on their return journey from Northern Ireland last evening.

The Defence Secretary is content with these amendments. On 2, he considers that the amendment is acceptable in the particular circumstances of the operation in question, and subject to the conditions and safeguards embodied within it. But he would be grateful if he could have the Prime Minister's agreement, and also that of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Attorney General, to the two new draft Rules during the course of tomorrow since they will need to be incorporated in the Operational Orders. (For convenience a photocopy of the existing Yellow Card is enclosed.)

I am sending copies of this letter to Terry Platt and Tony Hetherington.

Yours sincerely,
Ronnie Custis

(R A CUSTIS)

C W Roberts Esq

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Annex A to CUS/828
dated 26th July 1972
Reference

4A

DRAFT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. Soldiers may fire without warning if there is no other way to protect themselves or those whom it is their duty to protect from the danger of being killed or seriously injured. This supplements 12 of the Yellow Card.

2. For this operation only, a company commander may order the firing of heavy weapons (such as Carl Gustav) against positions from which there is sustained hostile firing, if he believes that this is necessary for the preservation of the lives of soldiers or of other persons whom it is his duty to protect. In deciding whether or not to use heavy weapons full account must be taken of the risk that the opening of fire may endanger the lives of innocent persons.

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APPENDIX TO ANNEX D

REDRAWING THE BORDER AND POPULATION TRANSFER

We have been asked to consider whether it could be practicable
1. ~~A course which has not yet been studied in~~
~~detail, and which may appear to be in harmony with the~~
~~nature of the military operation preceding the conference,~~
~~to move the dissident Republican population out of the~~
~~Northern Ireland~~
~~United Kingdom,~~ retaining only the Unionist population.

2. Though Republicanism is often equated with Roman Catholicism, the two terms by no means cover the same ground. Many Catholics prefer the union with Great Britain; and many more feel only an emotional attraction to the Republican ideal. No accurate and recent polls are available; a 1968 poll suggested that only one Catholic in three favoured a united Ireland, and a recent small sample poll pointed to similar conclusions. Nevertheless in the absence of any better guide to political sympathies the following paragraphs assume that the Catholic minority are to be removed from Northern Ireland.

3. This transfer of population could be achieved by:
- (a) Transferring to the Republic of Ireland (or conceivably to some separate status within the United Kingdom) areas which contain a Catholic majority;
 - (b) Moving individual Catholics from their homes in ~~Northern Ireland~~ *Republic of Ireland*; ~~the Six Counties~~ to new homes in the ~~26 counties~~;
 - (c) some combination of (a) and (b).

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4. In considering the transfer of territory, first consideration would be given to hiving off those areas with a simple Catholic majority at the most recent census. (To conduct a fresh plebiscite for the purpose of obtaining the majority view in each area would be to invite delay and chaos in the areas involved). The map at fig.1 shows as shaded areas those administrative areas (rural districts, urban districts, municipal boroughs and county boroughs) which would be transferred on this principle. Such a scheme would have a number of flaws:

- (i) It would create enclaves of Republican territory within Northern Ireland and Northern enclaves in the Republic.
- (ii) It would transfer nearly as many Protestants as Catholics.
- (iii) It would ignore the much larger Catholic population (284,000) who live in local authority areas where they are not in the majority.
- (iv) It would transfer some areas that are electorally Unionist. (They may be Unionist because some Catholics vote that way; or because Catholic families contain more young people who emigrate in search of work before reaching voting age).

5. Point (i) could be met by ignoring the enclaves on both ^{sides} ~~sides~~; but this would accentuate points (ii) and (iii) (as is shown by the scheme in Figure 2). Point (ii) holds true for any scheme, so intermixed is the population. Thus

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to transfer the whole of the territory west of the River Bann would put 238,000 Catholics and 227,000 Protestants into the Republic; to modify this to transfer Catholic Newry and retain much of Protestant County Londonderry would still transfer 130,000 Protestants with 192,000 Catholics. Point (iii) is also unavoidable: the 114,000 Catholics in Belfast form a fairly cohesive enclave, but it could not be linked to other Catholic areas without including considerable Protestant areas.

6. The ceding of part of the United Kingdom would raise obvious political difficulties, but quite apart from these, land transfer alone would not succeed in removing the dissidents. People would have to be moved as well. This too would raise formidable difficulties. Assuming it were undertaken in conjunction with a land transfer - the Republic would surely not accept 500,000 Catholics without land for them to live on - there would be a need to remove ^{200,000} ~~200,000~~ - 300,000 Catholics from other parts of Northern Ireland into the ceded areas; and to bring up to 200,000 Protestants out of the ceded areas into the remainder of Northern Ireland. About one third of the population of Northern Ireland would be on the move. Such a massive movement would not be peacefully accomplished; great resistance could be expected from many of those who should move. The Catholics would ~~face initial homelessness and unemployment (since they would outnumber the spaces left by the Protestants) and reduced social services, and all would face prolonged~~

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uncertainty and upheaval. Many would no doubt take the view that they should not be the ones to pay the price for peace in Northern Ireland: Catholics demanding justice where they were, and refusing to become refugees to obtain it, and Protestants seeing the need to move as poor reward for their "loyalty" to the Crown. Though financial inducement could overcome some of the reluctance, it is doubtful whether the cohesive and large Catholic population of Belfast would agree to move; the matter would for them be ^{as} much ~~one~~ of principle as ~~an~~ economic ~~one~~.

7. If voluntary or induced movement failed, would compulsion be practicable? It would raise in an even more acute form the definition of who should move. It is difficult to conceive a sure way of ascertaining the political views of a person who is unwilling to take the action which that information is designed to facilitate. Forced movement would moreover be a breach of Article 3(1) of the 4th Protocol of the European Convention ("... no-one shall be expelled.... from the territory of the State of which he is a national").

8. Any transfer of population, however accomplished, would be helpful only to the extent that it was permanent. To keep out of Northern Ireland those who had been transferred, a formidable barrier of control (including immigration controls) would have to be erected, not only on the new Border but also between the Republic and Great

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Britain. The administrative burden would be considerable; and HMG would also be in breach of its obligations to the EEC on the free movement of labour.

9. It is questionable whether a transfer of population, even if - which seems very doubtful - it could be effectively carried out and permanently secured, would bring about the desired result. There is no reason to suppose that transfer of their supporters and some of their homes to the ~~the~~ *Republic* ~~countries~~ would change the IRA's attitude. They would be more likely to see the moves, especially the transfer of land, as a further step towards their ultimate objective. Some of the ease with which terrorism can be conducted in Northern Ireland may be reduced, but the threat of terrorism will be far from eliminated.

10. In the Irish Republic opposition would be vehement and universal. Any reversal of the present policy of reconciliation, and the adoption of a policy of demarcation and compulsory ghettos, would emphasise in the crudest terms the present division of Ireland. It would show the utter failure of Mr. Lynch's policy of trusting the British, and his fall must be considered likely. A successor government would echo the hawkish sentiments of most Irishmen, and increased IRA activity from the South would ensue. Appeals to the UN, Strasbourg, etc., seem inevitable. The only possible palliative (and it is not seriously suggested that this has any real chance of bringing about Dublin acquiescence) would be to put the transferred territory into limbo and announce

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that those residing therein would still be considered part of the Northern Ireland electorate for any Plebiscite on the continuance of Northern Ireland as part of the UK.

11. Conclusion It is therefore extremely doubtful whether a transfer of territory, or population, could be effectively accomplished, or maintained; ^{or} ~~and~~ indeed, even if ~~most-improbably~~ it could be achieved, whether it would produce any worthwhile dividends. Any faint hope of success must be set against the implications of a course which would demonstrate to the world that HMG was unable to bring about the peaceable solution of problems save by expelling large numbers of its own citizens and doing so on a religious basis.

12. The ceding of smaller parts of Northern Ireland where there is a large Catholic majority (e.g. Newry, Londonderry) as one element in a settlement raises a different range of consideration and has not been examined in this Appendix.

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4 August 1972

The Prime Minister has seen the proposed directive on Interrogation by the Security Forces in Northern Ireland, in the form of the draft attached to the letter which Stephen sent to Cairncross on 3 August. He would like to propose a number of modifications, in case the document ever becomes public. The modifications are as follows:-

Paragraph 7: delete from "and psychological attack" in line 4 to "of the subject." in line 7.

Delete paragraph 13 entirely.

Paragraph 17: first line, after "medical" insert "inspection and".

Paragraph 24: end the paragraph at "which has been made" in line 3 (deleting the four points).

Paragraph 25: delete from "chosen" in line 1 to "above" in line 2, and from "deviate from" in line 4 to "will not" in line 5.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Robert Andrew.

Sgd. R.T.ARMSTRONG

T.O. Platt, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

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Ref: A02478

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PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland
(GEN 79)

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has circulated three memoranda - GEN 79(72) 18, on the political and constitutional future of Northern Ireland; GEN 79(72) 19, on a package of security measures and changes in the administration of justice; and GEN 79(72) 17, covering a report by officials on the legal aspects of possible measures to deal with terrorist organisations.

2. These three subjects are interlinked in that the suppression of terrorism is an indispensable ingredient of any political settlement for the Province. Nevertheless, you may think it convenient to take GEN 79(72) 18 first (since its subject matter is both more fundamental and less likely to raise immediate practical problems) and then to consider the two memoranda about our policy towards terrorist organisations.

The Future of Northern Ireland

3. In GEN 79(72) 18, the Secretary of State proposes that, in view of the absence of any consensus among the Ulster interests themselves and the certainty that they would unite to oppose any solution which we put forward, we should let them have their say at the conference on 25th-27th September and should then produce a Green Paper setting out, for general consideration, the ideas which we consider right but can perhaps link, presentationally, with points emerging from the conference.

4. The Secretary of State also reverts to the projected plebiscite on the Border but admits that, in terms of legislative priority, it must take second place to his proposed legislation to establish special courts.

5. Finally, he indicates in Annex 1 the main elements of the constitutional settlement which he envisages at the end of direct rule - i.e. the permanent abolition of Stormont, coupled with enlarged Northern Ireland representation in the Westminster Parliament, a "regional assembly" in Belfast and the transfer of the law and order function to the United Kingdom Government. He promises further memoranda elaborating these suggestions.

6. All of this seems sensible, particularly if publication of a Green Paper were linked with the implication in paragraph 3 of Annex 1 that

legislation on the plebiscite might have to be postponed in order to give priority to the security legislation discussed in his other memoranda. Public opinion would probably endorse this assessment of relative priorities; and a deferment of the plebiscite until after the publication of a Green Paper would go some way towards remedying the defect in the Secretary of State's earlier proposals, i.e. that voters in the plebiscite would be asked to say whether or not they wished to continue to "belong" to Northern Ireland without any indication of the kind of Northern Ireland, in constitutional terms, they were being invited to accept or to reject.

7. But the Green Paper will be helpful in this respect, of course, only if it gives at least some indication of the way in which our own thoughts are moving. And here the Secretary of State's intentions are not clear. On the one hand he says (paragraph 5 of his covering note) that we must "hold back our views on what the solution should be for as long as possible". On the other hand he proposes (paragraph 8 of Annex 1) "to draw the attention of the forthcoming conference" - i.e. even before the Green Paper is published - to certain "basic facts which need to be recognised"; and some of these, particularly (c) and (e), give a pretty clear lead to the direction of his own thinking. The Committee may therefore wish to satisfy themselves how far the Secretary of State does in fact intend to go during the conference and at what point, in relation to the publication of the Green Paper, he envisages that we should make our own intentions public.

8. The point is of practical, as well as political, importance since the Secretary of State himself admits that our solution, whatever form it may take, is the one thing which is liable to unite the otherwise divided parties and to unite them in opposition to ourselves. And the moment when that solution is made public is likely, therefore, to be the moment of maximum strain for the security forces. The Committee will wish to endorse, therefore, the strengthening of the RUC and the Ministry of Home Affairs which the Secretary of State proposes in paragraph 12 of his Annex 1.

The Security Package

9. The Secretary of State's proposals are summarised in paragraph 2 of GEN 79(72) 19. Taking his proposals point by point:-

- (a) Ministers will have no difficulty in agreeing that we should continue, so far as possible, to use the normal courts to deal with terrorists.
- (b) This proposal involves amending Regulation 24. A. to make clear:-
 - (i) that the proscription of the Irish Republican Army includes the Provisional Wing as well as the Officials;
 - (ii) that the offence of becoming or remaining a member of a proscribed organisation is extended to include professing to be a member of it or speaking on its behalf, and perhaps financing and fund-raising also. Moreover, any person who is present at a number of meetings of an unlawful association, or speaks on its behalf, will have to prove that he is not a member of it.

Proposal (i) could be circumvented by changes of name (cf. a recent Intelligence report that the Officials were thinking of calling themselves the "Irish Revolutionary Army"). But there are reasons for not attempting to define a subversive organisation on the lines of Section 3 of the Canadian Act, since either it then becomes necessary to prove in every single case that the organisation in question satisfies the definition or we are in the dilemma of stating conditions which have to be satisfied while declaring arbitrarily that certain organisations satisfy them.

Proposal (ii) admittedly reverses the normal onus of proof - i.e. it is incumbent on the defendant to establish his innocence instead of on the prosecution to establish his guilt. But this seems inherent in the nature of the case.

- (c) In favour of the proposal to introduce special courts or tribunals (which is also discussed in Appendix 1 to GEN 79(72) 17) it can be argued that we should in principle be substituting a judicial process for the executive machinery which at present governs internment and detention. — But it will undoubtedly be politically controversial to introduce judicial processes different from those of the normal courts (although the Secretary of State deploys the counter arguments in paragraph 5 of the Annex to GEN 79(72) 19); and the Attorney General, who may well be

supported by the Lord Chancellor, is likely to emphasise the difficulty of associating judges with the kind of court described in paragraph 4 of Appendix 1 to GEN 79(72) 17. If Ministers are convinced, however, that the introduction of special courts or tribunals would have a material impact in terms of convicting terrorists, the political price may be thought to be worth paying. But, if so, it will be necessary to find room for the necessary legislation; and some other item in the legislative programme may have to be sacrificed.

- (d) A statement of intention to end internment will have political merit both with the Opposition at Westminster and with the SDLP in Northern Ireland. As regards the "hard core" who cannot be released, the Secretary of State proposes that, pending the creation of the special courts, the individuals concerned should continue to be detained under Regulation 11, subject to review by a "special interim body". The Secretary of State recognises that this may be unacceptable to the SDLP, who may withdraw from the projected conference as a result. Since the conference is likely to be unproductive in any event, this price, too, may be thought worth paying.
 - (e) To begin to dismantle the Special Powers Act will be politically popular. Paragraph 8 of the Annex to GEN 79(72) 19, however, envisages retaining for the time being those parts of the Act which confer powers on the security forces. These are presumably those relating to stopping and searching, etc; but do they also include the powers of arrest without warrant?
 - (f) Given an intention to dispense with internment, there seems no alternative to the detention under Regulation 11 of persons arrested as terrorists until special courts or tribunals are introduced. As pointed out in paragraph 3 of Appendix 3 to GEN 79(72) 17, however, this will certainly be criticised as a disguised form of internment without the provision of the present Regulation 12 for representations to an advisory committee. How far will the proposed "special interim body" meet this criticism?
10. The practical implications are:-
- (a) Immediate amendment of Regulation 24.A. by Order in Council under the urgency procedure. It will be necessary, when Parliament reassembles, to justify doing, in the Recess,

something which was not thought necessary while the House was sitting. It also assumes that Ministers are satisfied that the issues are not such as to warrant a Bill.

- (b) The introduction of legislation as soon as possible to provide for the establishment of special courts or tribunals and to repeal the Criminal Justice (Temporary Provisions) Act (Northern Ireland) 1970 as proposed in paragraph 8 of the Annex to GEN 79(72) 19.

11. In the final sentence of GEN 79(72) 19, the Secretary of State challenges his colleagues to suggest viable alternatives to achieve the same ends as his proposals. It is difficult to envisage what these could be. But there is one other aspect of those proposals which merits a moment's thought. The legislation on special courts will take time; and it will take still more time, once the Bill is law, before the courts can be fully operational. In other words the new machinery is unlikely to be effective much before the year of direct rule comes to an end (in March, 1973) and our permanent political and constitutional solution has to be put into effect (unless we are prepared, or compelled, to extend direct rule for a further period). If the Government are challenged on this point, will they admit that the apparatus of special courts etc. will continue (for how long?) into the period of the permanent settlement? If it does not, it is hardly worth the trouble of legislating to create the courts. But, if it does, we shall face the anomalous situation that, although the permanent settlement in the form in which the Secretary of State envisages it in paragraph 10 of Annex 1 to GEN 79(71) 18 will result in Northern Ireland's becoming more rather than less part of the United Kingdom (with, incidentally, increased representation in the Parliament at Westminster), we shall simultaneously be establishing in the Province a judicial system which would not be acceptable in any other part of the United Kingdom. This may be inevitable; and it has a precedent in the Republic. But it may not be very easy to defend if it has to last for very long.

Donek 1972

8th September, 1972

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*Prime Minister
(for information)*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1

TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 7022

CONFIDENTIAL

NO 19/3A

29th November 1972

AN 2

RAH
Dear Christopher,

At the GSN 79(72)33rd meeting on 11th September the Prime Minister said that "the question of members of the UDR who were also associated with the UDA required further consideration. The Secretary of State (for Northern Ireland) should circulate a note indicating what he proposed".

The policy in force at that time was established in July 1972 in the light of three major factors. First, the UDA is not an illegal organisation and membership of it is not an offence under military law. Secondly, an important function of the UDA is to channel into a constructive and disciplined direction Protestant energies which might otherwise become disruptive. Thirdly, although an application to join the UDR would not be automatically rejected because of UDA membership, due weight would be given in the vetting process to extreme Protestant sympathies and a person known to be a member of the UDA would be most unlikely to be admitted.

Against this background, the policy established in July was that an officer should be asked to resign if he took an active part in UDA activities. A soldier would be warned if suspected of sufficient sympathy for UDA aims to affect his military duties or call in question his loyalty; if his conduct arising from UDA membership constituted a military offence or unsatisfactory conduct, he would be dismissed.

This policy was kept under review, but only recently has it been considered necessary to make changes. Following discussions with the GOC, and consultation with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Defence Secretary has decided to apply this policy more strictly. He has therefore approved a new Regimental Routine Order which was issued on 27th November. I attach the text of this at Annex. It was

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not considered desirable or practical to make membership of the UDA a bar in itself to membership of the UDR. For presentational reasons, the Order also refers to membership of the Catholic Ex-Servicemen's Association which has strong Republican sympathies.

Following this new Order, officers whose loyalty is suspect will be asked to retire or resign; soldiers will be dismissed under the regulation which allows this to be done because "their services are no longer required". No specific explanation will be given; we employ only those we wish to continue to employ and our action will be within the terms and conditions accepted on joining the Regiment.

We do not expect that this change will result in many more than about 50 dismissals; and they will be carried out gradually over a period of about two weeks.

I am sending this copies of this letter to Antony Acland, Terry Platt, Graham Angel and Tony Hetherington, and to Brian Norbury.

Yours sincerely,

Ronnie Cusick

(R A CUSTIS)

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ANNEX

REGIMENTAL ROUTINE ORDER

MEMBERSHIP OF EXTREMIST ORGANISATIONS

1. Recent activities by members of sectarian organisations have shown a need to clarify the policy towards members of the UDR who are involved in such organisations as the UDA and CESA.

2. The UDR is a non-sectarian force, and any active involvement in a sectarian organisation is bound to call into question a soldier's suitability for continued membership of the Regiment. If a soldier's sympathy for the UDA, CESA or any similar organisation is strong enough to affect the performance of his military duties or to call in question his future loyalty or his complete impartiality, he will be discharged.

3. We have reached the stage where men who are loyal to Her Majesty must make a clear decision as to where they stand, and must realise that the best way to contribute to the safety of the community is to give their undivided support to the Security Forces.

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VITA

Heather Wakenshaw was born in Miami Beach Florida on August 30, 1973. She attended public schools in Florida and North Carolina. She graduated from Franklin High School in Western North Carolina, and went on to receive her Bachelors of Science in both Anthropology and Parks and Recreation Management from Western Carolina University in 2000. During her leave from school, she worked as an archaeologist in upstate New York and as a project assistant for a teacher support service program. She entered the graduate program in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Tennessee in 2001. In the summer of 2002, she spent the summer in Belfast, Northern Ireland where she worked as an archaeologist while conducting research on her thesis at Queens University. After graduation, she accepted a position with the Monroe County Planning and Environmental Resources Department. She will spend her days drinking margaritas and her evenings watching the sunset.

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08/27/03

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